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The great and chief end.., of men's uniting into common-wealths, and
putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their [lives,
liberties and estates].
John Locke*
The rights and duties of allegiance and protection are corresponding
rights and duties... [Wherever] I owe allegiance to my country, there it owes
me protection, and wherever my Government owes me no protection I owe it
no allegiance and can commit no treason.
Cong. John Martin Broomall***
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion
by private actors.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist*"*
* Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. B.A., 1974; J.D. 1981,
University of Michigan. Research for this Article was generously supported by the
Bradley Institute for Democracy and Public Values of Marquette University. I would
also like to thank Patricia Bradford, Jacquelyn Core, Judith McMullen and Phoebe
Williams for commenting on early versions of this Article, listening to the revisions,
editing and in many cases pushing me much harder in directions that I might not other-
wise have seen with the result that I arrived at conclusions that were greatly more
satisfying. I dedicate this article to Jeff and Carly with the confidence and hope that
their lives too will be much happier and more secure when everyone enjoys as
fundamental rights their same opportunities.
** SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT Section 123-24 (C. B. McPherson ed.,
1980) (1690) (emphasis in original).
*** CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263-64 (1866) (successfully urging
enactment of the Civil Rights Act over the veto of President Andrew Johnson).
**** DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Sen's., 489 U.S. 189, 195
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INTRODUCTION
The state action doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment is more than
merely a "conceptual disaster area," as Charles Black characterized it a
generation ago.' To paint it that way, after all, is simply to complain about
its lack of coherence.' The problem with the state action doctrine is far
deeper. It reflects a profound ignorance of the workings of federalism and the
origins and concerns of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.3 In that respect, the doctrine continues to bear the
scars of the Slaughter-House Cases4 of 1873.
This article seeks to resolve the quagmire of the state action doctrine by
reexamining what is perhaps the most paradoxical dimension of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of that illusive phrase "No State shall" which introduces
all of the Amendment's guarantees.' It focuses on the problem of private
accountability under the Fourteenth Amendment. But that focus also,
necessarily, concerns the proper and complementary roles of the Supreme
Court, Congress and the states in securing the fundamental interests of
citizenship against violation from any quarter.
(1989).
1. Charles L. Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967). I have argued
elsewhere that in the hands of Justice Rehnquist the doctrine is in fact becoming more
coherent, but even more pernicious for the effort. See Alan R. Madry, State Action
and the Obligation of the States to Prevent Private Harm: The Rehnquist Transforma-
tion and the Betrayal of Fundamental Commitments, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 781 (1992).
2. On the difference and relationship between coherence and truth, see Joseph
Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273 (1992), and JERRY A. FODOR
AND ERNEST LEPORE, HOLISM (1992).
3. Justice Rehnquist is to that extent correct when he holds that nothing in the
Due Process Clause requires the states to protect people against people. The great
error is when the Court, having found the Due Process Clause barren of such a duty,
fails to look elsewhere to find it. For example, in DeShaney, based only on the
Court's earlier decisions concerning the purpose of the Due Process Clause, Justice
Rehnquist concluded: "The Framers were content to leave the extent of governmental
obligation [to protect people from each other] to the democratic political processes."
489 U.S. at 195.
4. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
5. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce laws which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor deny any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
[Vol. 59
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PRIVATE ACCOUNTABILITY
These two distinct, though obviously related questions of state responsi-
bility for private conduct and private accountability under the Constitution,6
are merely implicit in the contemporary doctrine of state action. Indeed, the
thorough incoherence of that doctrine is largely attributable to the Court's
failure to disentangle these issues. The Court instead determines the initial
applicability of the Amendment to each circumstance using a single test which
is insensitive to the nuances of either. If a state sufficiently "involves" itself
in private conduct, then the private conduct is itself state action, the private
party a state actor, and the conduct is subject to the standards of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Correlatively, state regulation of interpersonal affairs
is not subject to the Amendment unless the regulation sufficiently "involves"
the state in the private conduct.7 Once a private party is transformed into a
state actor, or the state conduct is found to be subject to the Amendment, i.e.,
once there is the requisite "state action" to satisfy the premise of the
Amendment, the exact same standard is applied to either circumstance.'
Among the consequences of this approach is that in some circumstances,
private parties may be sued in the federal courts directly under the Fourteenth
Amendment for purely private initiatives. Indeed, as the Court has given
scope to the critical notion of "involvement," a private party may be held to
account even when his or her conduct was compelled by the state.9 The
poverty of "involvement" as a standard for state and private liability is
apparent as soon as one attempts to give substance to the notion. The
immediate intuitive reaction is that the idea is altogether reasonable, at least
as applied to the conduct of the states; if a state becomes involved in any
6. It is uncontroversial that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees apply to
initiatives of the states. How the guarantees apply may be controversial but their
applicability is not. The heart of the problem of state action then involves the two
questions identified in the text. First, does the Fourteenth Amendment apply at all to
private conduct. That question might most accurately be expressed as follows: Does
the Fourteenth Amendment create rights between people that can be vindicated in the
federal courts? Second, does the Fourteenth Amendment apply to state regulation of
private initiatives? Again, that question could be more technically expressed as: Does
the Fourteenth Amendment create rights between citizens and their states with regard
to state regulation of private conduct? In terms of the language of state action
doctrine, the first question might also be phrased: Is private conduct ever state action;
and the second: What state action is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
7. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 35-56. These two inquiries are distinct.
First, the conduct must be governed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It must, consistent
with "No State shall," be "state action." Only when the conduct is first determined to
be state action is it then subject to scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. See also
supra note 6.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 42-51.
19941
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conduct which violates some fundamental interest, it ought to be enjoined and
held liable for any injury. However, some commentators have argued
plausibly that a state is implicated in all private conduct simply by virtue of
the fact that it has the power to intervene, at least by creating the disincentive
of a civil remedy.'" It begs the question to respond that the state is not
responsible for all private conduct, since it is precisely the function of
"involvement" to carve out the domain of the states' responsibility. Obviously
what is required, and what is not supplied by any merely formalistic notion
of involvement, is a substantive theory of the duties of the states to mediate
private conduct.
The notion of "involvement" and the Court's unitary test are also
problematic when viewed from the point of view of private accountability.
If involvement were interpreted as broadly as suggested in the preceding
paragraph, then in its corollary application to private conduct, the breadth of
the concept has the perverse effect of making every person a federal agent for
every private initiative. The Court has repeatedly abjured this, however, in the
name of maintaining the wall between public and private." Finding a line
short of this position, however, has proven illusive. That and the thorough
incoherence of "involvement" as the doctrine's touchstone is apparent from its
erratic application by the Court itself. 2
In an earlier essay, I separated the problem of state responsibility from
the problem of private accountability and examined the former. 3 My
conclusion there, that the Fourteenth Amendment should be understood to
require the states to protect fundamental rights against private infringement,
10. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action
and Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 893, 894-95 (1975); Jerre C.
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1963).
11. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)
("[T]his Court in the Civil Rights Cases [citation omitted] affirmed the essential
dichotomy set forth in that Amendment between deprivation by the State ... and
private conduct .... "); accord, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982).
In Lugar, the Court added that the doctrine also "preserves an area of individual
freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power." Id. at 936.
This is simply not true. In the first place, the state action doctrine has never been
interpreted as a limitation on Congress' power to create law. Secondly, even if it did
limit the power of the federal government, the real consequence is to leave private
conduct to the discretion of state courts. See infra note 60. In addition, freedom to
one person may well mean a lack of freedom to someone who happens to be the
victim of the freedom of the first. No freedom is expanded; at best the state has
simply failed to mediate and left outcomes to the clash of private powers.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 40-51; Madry, supra note 1, at 809-12.
13. Madry, supra note 1.
[Vol. 59
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was based upon the nature of the interests that best explain the Amendment's
guarantees. 4 With only slight exaggeration, any interest that might be
attributed to those guarantees can be violated by a private party as well as by
the state.'5 The Constitution's commitment to the preservation of those
interests, therefore, prima facie entails an obligation to protect them
universally.
In this essay, I hope to expand the foundation of that conclusion and
further explore its implications for private accountability and the duties of the
Court, Congress and state lawmakers. Part I extends the discussion from state
responsibility to private accountability. It first examines the paradoxes
implicit in the Courts doctrine of private accountability. Among the forces
that have shaped the present doctrine of private accountability, and motivated
the scholarly debate, is the palpable need to protect the fundamental interests
of people against invasion by powerful private initiatives. To open the federal
courts to private action against private parties under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as currently conceived, however, entails accepting a theory of consti-
tutional interpretation that no one seriously countenances. That tension, I
argue, is resolved by reading "No State shall" in conjunction with the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as creating a duty, running from each state
to its citizens, the nature of which is that the states must intervene between
private parties to protect fundamental interests. The failure of a state to
provide adequate redress would be reviewable by the Supreme Court.
The soundness of this view as an account of the Fourteenth Amendment
is suggested by a reinterpretation of Justice Bradley's opinion for the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883. That opinion, aside from describing the mechanism
outlined above, implicitly gave an expansive interpretation to the Privileges
and Immunities Clause as the source of the fundamental right to protection
14. These are distinct dimensions. The Constitution might coherently be read not
to require regulation but to nonetheless impose standards for any regulation once the
state within its discretion decides to regulate. See infra text accompanying notes 24-
26.
15. Barbara Rook Snyder has argued that the initiatives of a state are more
serious than private initiatives because they represent the violation of a trust not owed
by private parties to other private parties, the nature of which is that the state will
always act in the best interests of its citizens. Barbara Rook Snyder, Private
Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth
Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1053, 1060-63 (1990). While this is
certainly true, it nevertheless presumes that in both cases there is harm to a significant
interest but that there is an additional harm when the interest is violated by the state.
Snyder's argument does not concern itself with the intention of the framers of the
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that the states must not fail to honor and enforce. 6 Following the scholarly
lead of Robert Kaczorowski and others, the present Article revives the notion
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause enshrines all of the fundamental
interests of citizenship, including the right to be protected by the government.
Thus, whereas the earlier article was based on a general sense of the interests
to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, this Article grounds the right
to government protection more concretely and specifically in a historical
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Any argument based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause must of
course contend with the Slaughter-House Cases, decided eleven years before
the Civil Rights Cases. Fearful of the effect that a robust Privileges and
Immunities Clause would have on "the whole theory of the relations of the
State and Federal government to each other,"'7 Slaughter-House emasculated
the clause and thereby removed the foundations of the Civil Rights Cases.
Drawing on recent scholarship on the origins of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Part II argues that the Republican framers debated the effect of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause on the scheme of federalism, that they
intended to alter the original allocation of discretion to the states. They did
so too for good reasons, consistent with the goals of federalism, and in a
manner that affected the functions of federalism only marginally, if at all.
The argument of Part II extends the insights of recent scholarship on the
Privileges and Immunities Clause by focusing on the fundamental right to
protection by the government and its implications for our understanding of the
Civil Rights Cases and the state action doctrine.
Part III examines in more detail the role that this view of state action
leaves for Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
implementing the guarantees of Section I" The Court's current state action
doctrine renders Section 5 virtually redundant. If private conduct is itself state
action under some circumstances so that it can violate the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Article III would appear adequate to endow the courts
with jurisdiction over those cases. Under the procedures imagined by the Civil
Rights Cases the principle route to vindicate the fundamental right to
government protection is through an action in state court with an appeal to the
Supreme Court. What then is left for Congress? The answer again was given
16. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in
its entirety: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, cl. 2.
17. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873).
18. Section 5 reads in its entirety: "The Congress shall have power to enforce,
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by the Civil Rights Cases: Congress may create a private cause of action
between private parties when, because a state is likely to be unwilling to
protect the interest, the Supreme Court's review would provide inadequate
protection. Judgment in a private cause of action would be the premise for
federal enforcement of those rights.
Part IV brings the discussion back to the concerns of Slaughter-House
and examines the effect of the intended Fourteenth Amendment on the original
strategy of federalism.
I. THE PARADOX OF CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINE
AND ITS RESOLUTION
The paradox in the Court's treatment of private accountability derives
from the enormous gap between what it says and what it does and its failure
to offer an explanation that adequately bridges the two. Shelley v.
Kraemer,9 for instance, early in the modem development of the doctrine,
removed from the Fourteenth Amendment in no uncertain terms any concern
for the way in which private parties treat other private parties. "The action
inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment," Chief Justice
Vinson wrote, "is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the
States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful."" Shelley purported to be paraphrasing
the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,2" widely regarded as the source of the current
state action doctrine.' There, Justice Bradley, writing for the majority,
observed somewhat more ambiguously that: "It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject matter of the amendment."'
Shelley itself prohibited a state from enforcing a purely private, racially
restrictive deed covenant. That decision is still consistent with a view of the
Fourteenth Amendment which excludes private initiatives from the scope of
its protection. The prohibited conduct in Shelley, after all, was the state's
enforcement of the racially restrictive covenant. Shelley is perhaps best
19. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
20. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
21. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
22. See, e.g., Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13. It was preceded, however, by Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879), and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
Most, if not all scholarly writing accepts the continuity between the CivilRights Cases
and the modem doctrine. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 15; Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 507 (1985). But see Madry, supra
note 1, at 786-95; infra text accompanying notes 71-79.
23. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
1994]
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interpreted as representing a moderate version of the state action doctrine,
according to which the Fourteenth Amendment establishes certain interests as
fundamental, but creates rights relative to those interests only against the states
and regulates the states in regard to private conduct only when they decide to
regulate such conduct.' When a state intervenes between private parties, it
must do so in a manner consistent with those fundamental interests.25 Such
a doctrine is still a far cry, at least in theory, from one that would require the
states to protect those interests against private invasion, and even further from
a doctrine that would give aggrieved victims of private conduct a cause of
action in the federal courts directly under the Constitution. 6
With the exception of a few isolated cases involving free speech
claims,27 in which the state action issues were allowed to remain unaddressed
below the surface, the Court never again followed Shelley's approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment. Undoubtedly the horrible opacity of the Court's own
rationalization contributed to that opinion's subsequent neglect.28 What
survives of Shelley, beyond its baffling specter, is the dicta quoted earli-
er----"no shield against merely private conduct."29 That dicta is now invoked
talismanically, but interpreted in a way that theoretically restricts the
24. I distinguish three versions of state action theory. The first is the moderate
version, associated with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and described in the
text above. The second is a strong version, the subject of this article, according to
which the states have a constitutional duty to protect people's fundamental interests
against infringement by other people. The third is the Court's current doctrine which
ostensibly restricts the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to initiatives of the states
themselves, but in fact permits actions against private parties who are transformed into
state actors when the state becomes involved in the private initiative. I refer to this last
version as narrow state action.
25. For a more complete discussion of this interpretation of Shelley and the
moderate theory of state action see Madry, supra note 1, at 795-806.
26. In practice there would be little difference between Shelley's moderate state
action and the stronger theory of state action that would require the states to protect
against private invasions of fundamental interests. This is because the only way for
a state to avoid the applicability of constitutional standards to any particular dispute
is to refuse to decide the dispute at all, a politically untenable position to take in most
cases. Widespread refusal to entertain actions involving constitutional standards would
obviously result in anarchy. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71 and Alexander,
supra note 10.
27. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (citing
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
28. Herbert Wechsler's critique of Shelley v. Kraemer is widely regarded as a
classic. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). For a critical discussion of Wechsler's critique see Madry,
supra note 1, at 804-05.
29. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
[Vol. 59
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protection of the Amendment far beyond what even Shelley can reasonably be
read to have contemplated.
For example, while the moderate doctrine of Shelley would have brought
within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment a state's legitimation of
creditor self-help, the Court in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks0 refused to even
consider New York's warehouseman's self-help statute3 as state action
subject to the Constitution unless the statute involved the state in the execution
of the remedy.32 In Blum v. Yaretsky33 the Court narrowed the compass to
the barest minimum. Under Blum, the only state conduct respecting private
initiatives that implicates the Fourteenth Amendment is the encouragement or
compulsion of private conduct that the states themselves are prohibited from
undertaking.34 Blum, if followed consistently, would allow states unlimited
discretion to regulate private initiatives.
Despite this emphatic commitment to a narrow state action doctrine, one
which theoretically excludes private conduct from the concerns of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, both before and after Shelley, has routinely
allowed private actions in the federal courts against private parties and held
private conduct to be subject to the same standards of the Fourteenth
Amendment as applied to the states.35
This paradox between theory and practice first arose in the deceptively
sympathetic context of the White Primary Cases.36 In this series of cases,
30. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
31. N.Y. U.C.C. § 7-210 (McKinney 1964).
32. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 160.
33. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). See also Madry, supra note 1, at 814-24.
34. But see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, and Scalia, JJ.).
35. These actions are generally brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983. A finding of state action is a predicate for an action under § 1983
because the Act refers to violations of constitutional rights. The same criteria for state
action also apply to the condition articulated in § 1983 that the conduct complained
of be under color of state law. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928
(1982); infra text accompanying notes 226-33.
36. This series of cases, all concerned with the conduct of Democratic primaries
in Texas, began with Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (Holmes, J.), in which
the Court struck down a Texas statute excluding Blacks from voting in Democratic
primaries. It included Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (Cardozo, J.), which
invalidated a state statute authorizing racial discrimination; Grovey v. Townsend, 295
U.S. 45 (1935) (Roberts, J.), in which the Court refused to invalidate the party's own
racial discrimination; and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 634 (1944) (Reed, J.),
overturning Grovey. The White Primary Cases culminated in Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953) (no majority opinion), in which the Court extended the Amendment's
protections from state to county primaries.
19941
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the Court battled the efforts of the State of Texas and the Texas Democratic
Party to exclude Blacks from voting in Democratic primaries. Each case was
filed in federal court seeking damages against officials of the state Democratic
party, an organization which the Court conceded was a private association.37
On that ground, the Court might have refused to take jurisdiction of these
cases and awaited appeals from the results of actions in the state courts. The
cases then would have reached the Supreme Court through the same route
later traversed in Shelley and the Court would have addressed the decisions of
the state concerning the private conduct rather than the private conduct itself.
Instead, beginning with Nixon v. Condon38 in 1932 and culminating in Terry
v. Adams 9 in 1953 the Court found that the conduct of the Democratic party
was itself state action and the officials who administered its rules were subject
to sanctions under the same constitutional standards applicable to the states.
The justification for this stretch is no less mysterious than the miracle of
transubstantiation:" When there is a significant nexus between the private
actor and the state, or involvement of the state in the private initiative, the
private actor is transformed into an agent of the state and the private initiative
into state action.4'
37. See Smith, 321 U.S. at 664.
38. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
39. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
40. Transubstantiation is the term given by Catholic dogma to the transformation
of ordinary bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ in the sacrament of the
Eucharist, or Holy Communion.
41. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)
("[P]rivate conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection
Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been
found to have become involved in it."); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
173 (1972) ("Our holdings indicate that where the impetus for the discrimination is
private, the State must have 'significantly involved itself with invidious discrimina-
tions,'. . . in order for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the
constitutional prohibition.") (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)).
In more recent cases, the Court has spoken of a required "nexus" between the private
initiative and the state. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("The
complaining party must also show that 'there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."') (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). The inquiry is arguably the same and remains
in all events a factual one not informed by any normative theory of state responsibility
for private conduct and still based on an acceptance of narrow state action. See, e.g.,
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 ("Whether these different tests are actually different in
operation or simply different ways of characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry
that confronts the Court in such a situation need not be resolved here."). See Burton,
365 U.S. at 722 ("Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances .... ).
[Vol. 59
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In the early decisions, including the White Primary Cases, the significant
involvement was said to consist in the states' delegation of state authority to
the private actor, itself a dubious characterization.42 Since the White Primary
Cases the Court has found state action in private conduct and held the private
actor potentially liable for damages in an array of circumstances that defy
even that fiction.
It found state action, for instance, when a private carrier accepted a
charter from the District of Columbia to operate a municipal subway;43 when
a tenant of a municipal parking authority refused to serve Blacks in its res-
taurant;44 when a department store sought the assistance of the police to
remove protesters from a lunch counter; 4 when lunch counters refused
service to Blacks in accordance with state and municipal laws;46 when a
private club accepted a liquor license which required it to abide by its own
bylaws;47 and when a private creditor attached property with the aid of a
sheriff under an invalid pretrial creditor remedy.48 As recently as 1991 the
Court held that the exercise of a peremptory challenge by a private litigant in
a civil suit itself constituted state action subject to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.49
In many cases the Court's reasoning is utterly baffling. 0 For example,
in Reitman v. Mulkey"' the Court permitted a private action against the
owners of a discriminatory lunch counter because the police assisted in
removing protesting Blacks. The Court explained the involvement as follows:
42. These cases are especially problematic because each involved conduct at the
core of the Freedom of Assembly Clause of the First Amendment. Thus, the
Democratic party not only did not require any state authorization, it was largely
immune from state regulation of its membership.
43. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (Burton, J.).
44. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (Clark, J.).
45. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (Harlan, J.).
46. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (Warren, J.); Lombard
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (Warren, J.); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153
(1964) (Black, J.).
47. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.).
48. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
49. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). The Court could
have reached the same result in Edmonson under either the moderate theory of Shelley,
because the Court enforced the private, discriminatory decision, or the strong theory
which would have the states vigilantly guarding fundamental interests against violation
by anyone. See Madry, supra note 1.
50. Charles Black, among others, notoriously referred to the doctrine as a
"conceptual disaster area." Black, supra note 1, at 95.
51. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
1994]
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Although the State neither commanded nor expressly authorized or
encouraged the discriminations, the State had "elected to place its
power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination"
and by "its inaction... has... made itself a party to the refusal of
service . . ." which therefore could not be considered the purely
private choice of the restaurant operator.
52
The theory behind this sort of decision making seems to be that as long as we
are doing something virtuous, we don't have to offer a coherent explanation.
Indeed, the Court regularly insists that a theory of its decisions would only
inhibit it. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority3 the Court explained:
Because the virtue of the right to equal protection of the laws could
lie only in the breadth of its application, its constitutional assurance
was reserved in terms whose imprecision was necessary if the right
were to be enjoyed in the variety of individual-state relationships
which the Amendment was designed to embrace. For the same
reason, to fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of
state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an
"impossible task" which "This Court has never attempted." 4
The Court has invoked this language talismanically ever since.51 Unfor-
tunately, as I have argued elsewhere, the very vagueness of the doctrine has
permitted the Court to sharply back away from the salutary commitments that
motivated the early state action doctrine without acknowledging or justifying
the departure.56
The development of private accountability inevitably fed back on the
issue of state responsibility, and the parallel evolution of both sadly confirms
the worst fears of some scholars: Interpreting the Constitution to hold private
parties accountable under the same standards as applied to the states will only
dilute protections against the states.57 In terms of "involvement," if a state
were to become "involved" in private conduct any time it regulated a private
initiative, the regulated private actors would always be state actors, subject to
the Fourteenth Amendment. As agents of the state itself, they would be
judged by the standards applicable to state initiatives, standards altogether
52. Id. at 380.
53. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
54. Id. at 722.
55. For a recent occurrence see, e.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
56. See Madry, supra note 1. See also Lugar, 457 U.S. 922.
57. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking
"Rethinking State Action", 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 558 (1985).
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inappropriate for private actors. Of course, the Court might recognize that
these private "state" actors were in fact private parties with interests far
different from the states. That, however, would lead to this curious paradox:
The private agent would be a state agent for the purpose of bringing the agent
under the Amendment, but once under would shed her state identity for the
way in which the Amendment were to be applied. With that avenue closed,
the only escape is to exclude from the notion of "involvement" state regulation
of private initiatives. Thus, Justice Rehnquist in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks, considering the legitimacy of New York's self-help creditor remedy,
observed:
If the mere denial of judicial relief is considered sufficient encour-
agement to make the State responsible for those private acts, all
private deprivations of property would be converted into public acts
whenever the State, for whatever reason, denies relief sought by the
putative property owner.
Not only is this notion completely contrary to that "essential
dichotomy" between public and private acts, but it has been
previously rejected by this Court.58
Which returns us to the original paradox, somewhat expanded. While the
Court insists that the Fourteenth Amendment provides no shield against merely
private conduct and scales back the responsibility of the states to protect
citizens against citizens, it nonetheless allows actions in the federal courts
directly under the Amendment against private agents, mysteriously trans-
formed into state agents. The fiction would be no more harmful than any other
constructive doctrine, though certainly still awkward, if, like those doctrines,
it were supported by sound reasons consistent with the powers of the courts.
However, the problem with this fiction is that the Court has never offered a
sound reason for its currency, which would seem especially imperative given
that the Court is simultaneously committed to a narrow interpretation of "No
State shall."
The incoherent state of the contemporary state action doctrine is thus, in
large part, a legacy of the White Primary Cases. Shelley v. Kraemer showed
58. 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978) (citation omitted). Earlier in that opinion, Justice
Rehnquist wrote:
It would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of our previous
cases, the notion of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment to hold
that the mere existence of a body of property law in a State, whether
decisional or statutory, itself amounted to "state action" even though no
process or state officials were ever involved in enforcing that body of law.
Id. at 160 n.10.
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one way out of the thicket, as I will discuss below, but guaranteed its own
desuetude by again applying to state regulation of private initiatives the same
standards as applicable to initiatives of the state itself.59
Critical scholarly reaction to the narrow doctrine' has come primarily
from two directions, both sharing a common origin in the pioneering work of
Robert Hale6' and Harold Horowitz.62 Common to all of these scholars63
is that though dismayed by the Court's reasoning, they applaud opening the
federal courts to private actions and indeed have called for an even greater
expansion of constitutional private accountability.
Down one direction, some of these scholars, apparently untroubled by the
mystery of involvement, have urged that the notion of involvement be
enlarged to include at least every act permitted by the state. Surely by permit-
ting the conduct, the argument goes, the state has involved itself in the private
initiative at least as much as in any other circumstance already recognized to
constitute sufficient involvement.' After all, if the state has the power to
59. For a more thorough discussion of Shelley see Madry, supra note 1, at 795-
806.
60. Of course, not all scholars are critical of the doctrine. A notable recent
exception is Maimon Schwarzschild. See Maimon Schwarzschild, Value Pluralism and
the Constitution: In Defense of the State Action Doctrine, 1988 S. CT. REV. 129.
Along with Justice White in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., Schwarzschild makes the
common mistake of finding in the state action doctrine, particularly its avowed
commitment to the "essential dichotomy between public and private acts," constitution-
al protection for a sphere of private discretion. See supra note 11. But as Jesse
Choper pointed out long ago:
The primary purpose of the state action requirement of the fourteenth
amendment's due process and equal protection provisions is not to protect
individual autonomy; that is, it is not meant to guarantee individuals
immunity from all governmental regulation. Rather, the state action
requirement serves to allocate power within the federal system; it limits the
power of the national government vis-i-vis the states.
Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Function" and "Power
Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 757, 757-58.
61. Robert Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and FifteenthAmendmentsAgainst
Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAW GUILD REV. 627 (1946).
62. Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957).
63. Among the most notable contributions to this scholarship in addition to the
work of Professors Hale and Horowitz are at least the following: Chemerinsky, supra
note 22; Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982); Lawrence Alexander, supra note 10; Black,
supra note 1; and William W. Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review,
and the Talisman of State Action, 1965 DUKE L.J. 220.
64. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 10.
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prevent the conduct, then surely its failure to intervene implicates the state in
the causal chain which resulted in the deprivation of the claimed fundamental
interest. Whatever one thinks of the causal attribution, the argument still begs
at least two questions: (1) whether or not the state had any duty to intervene,
so that its failure to act is normatively significant, and (2) how the state's
failure to discharge its legal duty can give rise to a cause of action against the
private perpetrator.
The second and more radical direction is less patient with the rhetoric of
involvement and more straight-forwardly concerned with the substantial power
of private parties to interfere with the fundamental interests at the foundation
of the Amendment's guarantees, in many cases, a power indistinguishable
from the power of the states. Erwin Chemerinsky, one of the most forceful
and articulate of this group, concluded:
I have argued that limiting the Constitution's protections to
state action is harmful because it permits deprivations of fundamen-
tal liberties and that it is completely unnecessary because nothing
valuable would be lost without it. The inescapable conclusion is
that the doctrine should be banished from American law. The effect
of discarding the concept of state action is that the Constitution
would be viewed as a code of social morals, not just of
governmental conduct, bestowing individual rights that no entity,
public or private, could infringe without a compelling justification.
Such an approach makes sense especially because the Constitution
was designed to embody and celebrate values and to inculcate proper
acceptance of them, as much as to compel governments to abide by
them."5
Some such concern is, of course, the motivation for the entire school, as
it surely is for the Court as well. It is a deep and abiding concern of
American scholarship. The dissolution of the public-private distinction was
prominently among the preoccupations of the Legal Realists. 6 Laurence
Tribe only recently observed that
particularly where ostensibly "private" power is the primary source
of the coercion and violence that oppressed individuals and groups
experience, it is hard to accept with equanimity a rigid legal
65. Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 550.
66. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison
of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLuM. L. REv. 149 (1935).
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distinction between state and society. The pervasive system of racial
apartheid which existed in the South for a century after the Civil
War, for example, thrived only because of the "resonance of society
and politics... the close fit between private terror, public discrimi-
nation, and political exclusion." So too, where it is the state's
persistent inaction in the face of patterns of deprivation for which
state and society seem to many to bear collective responsibility, the
premise that only identifiable state "action" may be called to
constitutional account is deeply troubling. 7
The more radical branch avoids the danger of diluting the constitutional
guarantees noted earlier by recognizing that altogether different interests are
opposed when the states are accused than when private parties are alleged to
have invaded a fundamental interest. Unencumbered by a doctrine that
converts private actors into state actors, in each circumstance, the court must
strike a balance sensitive to the different particular interests involved." This
position nonetheless runs headlong into the unambiguous language of the
Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall." To accept this position then is to
disregard clear and substantial language in the Constitution. That necessarily
entails accepting as a general matter a theory of constitutional interpretation
and the Supreme Court's discretion that no one seriously proposes.
The debate thus presents us with the following dilemma: We either
exclude from the Constitution any concern for private conduct, a choice which
appears to run contrary to the fundamental commitments apparently embodied
in the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees, or we disregard the clear language
of the Constitution and accept an unacceptable theory of the Supreme Court's
powers, a horror which may explain in part the Court's own tortured path to
a larger state action doctrine.
In an earlier essay I argued for a proposition that opens the way to a third
alternative: the Fourteenth Amendment binds the states to protect the
fundamental interests of persons against invasion by anyone.69 Under this
strong version of state action, the Fourteenth Amendment would still not itself
be a source of legal rights among people. It would, however, require the
states to create or recognize legal rights consistent with a proper accommoda-
tion of the fundamental interests embodied in the Amendment's guarantees
and the significant opposed private interests. "No State shall" thus creates
legal rights between the people and the states the nature of which is that no
state shall fail to protect the fundamental interests of the people. Rather than
67. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, Refocusingthe "State Action"Inquiry: Separating State
Acts from State Actors, in CONSTITUTIONAL CHoicEs 246 (1985).
68. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 550-51.
69. Madry, supra note 1.
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"erect[ing] no shield against merely private conduct," the Constitution,
according to the third alternative, interposes the states as a shield, with the
Fourteenth Amendment as a sword at their backs. The principal route to the
vindication of these rights is an action in the state courts and an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court to review the actions of the state, much as in
Shelley v. Kraemer.7°
The difference between this strong version of state action and the more
moderate version that I attribute to Shelley is more theoretical than practical.
Under the moderate version, the states are not required to regulate private
conduct to protect fundamental rights. They might theoretically refuse to
enforce or protect the desires of either party in any category of dispute. The
result in that area would of course be anarchy and for that reason, refusing to
regulate would be politically and practically out of the question. Once a state
began to regulate, it would have to do so respecting the constitutionally
established fundamental interests. The strong version would require the states
to regulate for the purpose of protecting such fundamental interests.
The virtue of the strong version of state action is that it is both consistent
with the language of the Fourteenth Amendment and it does justice to the
yearning for universal protection for some interests regarded as fundamental,
interests which would appear to be the foundation for the Amendment's
guarantees.
It is also consistent with what is the best interpretation of the Civil Rights
Cases,7 the presumed root of contemporary doctrine, and through the Civil
Rights Cases, the intentions of the framers themselves. In the same way that
the strong version of state action can be read from "No State shall", one can
read it consistently with the dicta from the Civil Rights Cases quoted at the
outset: "It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amend-
ment."72 The prohibited state action is the failure to protect fundamental
interests. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of
the Amendment only in the sense that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
itself create rights between people.73
70. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). While this may be the principal and in most cases
sufficient route, when vindication of these rights requires additional action, or action
in the state courts is futile, other routes may be made available by Congress under
Section 5. See infra part III.
71. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
72. Id. at 11.
73. The Civil Rights Cases considered the power of Congress under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of § 1. The Court held invalid a
federal statute that provided private causes of action in the federal courts against
private accommodations, carriers and places of amusement that refused service because
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More importantly, once we recognize the possibility for this third
arrangement of rights, it is clear from the remainder of Justice Bradley's
opinion that this is precisely the Court's understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Bradley is careful to distinguish between the "invasion"
of rights, the term he uses above, and the "abrogation" and "denial" of rights,
which he says can only be done by the states:
In this connection, it is proper to state that civil rights, such as are
guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be
impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State
authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive
proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any
such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that indi-
vidual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true,
whether they affect his person, his property, or his reputation; but
if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done under State
authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presumably be
vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress. An
individual cannot deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold proper-
ty, to buy and sell, to sue in the courts, or to be a witness or a juror;
he may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment of the right
in a particular case; he may commit an assault against the person, or
commit murder, or use ruffian violence at the polls, or slander the
good name of a fellow citizen; but, unless protected in these
wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he
cannot destroy or injure the right; he will only render himself
amenable to satisfaction or punishment; and amenable therefore to
the laws of the State where the wrongful acts are committed.
Hence, in all those cases where the Constitution seeks to protect the
rights of the citizen against discriminative and unjust laws of the
State by prohibiting such laws, it is not individual offences but
abrogation and denial of rights, which it denounces, and for which
it clothes the Congress with power to provide a remedy. This
of race. Id. at 25. The Court found that Congress's power was limited to the
enforcement of rights given by § 1. Id. at 11. Those rights were against the states,
not against private parties. Id. at 17-18. Again, there is nothing inconsistent between
turning back a statute on those grounds and imposing upon states obligation to protect
people from people. The relief would be through an appeal to the Supreme Court
from the final decision of a state court in an action to vindicate the interest violated
by the private party. Nonetheless, the Court did leave room for Congress to open the
federal courts to private actions against private parties when the states failed to
vindicate the interests at stake. Id. at 16-17. See also infra part Il1.
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abrogation and denial of rights, for which the States alone were or
could be responsible, was the great seminal and fundamental wrong
which was intended to be remedied.74
The foregoing explains and gives force to other dicta appearing earlier in the
opinion:
Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition
against State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and
privileges .. .
Justice Bradley's careful reference in these passages to "[t]he wrongful
acts of an individual, unsupported by any such [state] authority, [being] simply
a private wrong 76 has been read to support the Court's doctrine of sufficient
involvement.77 The implication drawn from the dicta is that when there is
state authority, then the private act is more than a private wrong, it is state
action. The implication ignores, however, the rest of the language in the
passage, including most significantly the juxtaposition of the notions of
"invasion" and "abrogation and denial." The Court is quite clear, an individual
can never abrogate or deny a right, and it is abrogation and denial of rights
that is the "great seminal and fundamental wrong which was intended to be
remedied. '  As is clear from the passage, the rights79 are abrogated when
the state, among other things, fails to provide remedies for the private wrongs.
There is thus no need to convert private conduct into state conduct to
adequately protect fundamental interests against private initiatives. Those
interests are already adequately protected at the federal level through Supreme
Court review of state court decisions.
To reinterpret the Civil Rights Cases in this light is also to raise the
specter of the Slaughter-House Cases,"0 decided only ten years earlier. The
Court's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases is not, strictly speaking, con-
74. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 11.
76. Id. at 17.
77. See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
78. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18.
79. The reference to "rights" in this connection is probably best understood
against the then still widely accepted theory of natural rights. Natural rights would
have been moral rights, or ideal legal rights, which were antecedent to any laws,
including the Constitution. See Daniel A. Farber and John E. Muench, The Ideological
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 235, 241-46 (1984).
80. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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cerned with the state action doctrine, with offering an interpretation of the
general language "No State shall." It is concerned rather with identifying the
fundamental interests protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Plaintiffs argued that the Clause protected the
most basic interests of free citizens, including in that case, the freedom to
pursue one's trade without interference from a state created monopoly.82
The majority disagreed. The only interests protected by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the Court held, are those that have their source in other
provisions of the Constitution or legislation adopted pursuant to them.83
They include, for example, the rights to petition the federal government, to
hold its offices, to free access to its seaports and its courts. 4 The function
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause then was simply to explicitly create
rights between citizens and the states that would restrain the states from
interfering with rights already enjoyed between citizens and the federal
government. Coming to this conclusion, the Court was greatly impressed by
the fact that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2
referred to the privileges and immunities "of Citizens in the several States"
while the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
ferred only to the privileges or immunities of "citizens of the United
States."' s5 The former enjoyed a well recognized ambit which included
fundamental rights of citizenship. The Court referred to earlier decisions,
including Corfield v. Coryell,"6 which had declared the expansive scope of
the clause. The latter, by contrast, so the Court reasoned, could therefore only
refer to the rights given in the Constitution itself:
It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United
States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each
other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circum-
stances in the individual.
We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this
amendment of great weight in this argument, because the next
paragraph of this same section, which is the one mainly relied on by
the plaintiffs in error, speaks only of privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those citizens of
the several States ....
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
82. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 54-55.
83. Id. at 78-79.
84. Id. at 79.
85. Id. at 73-80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1, cl. 1.; U.S. CONST. art. IV, §
2, cl. 1.
86. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
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Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United
States, and the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State,
and what they respectively are, we will presently consider; but we
wish to state here that it is only the former which are placed by this
clause under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the
latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional
protection by this paragraph of the amendment.8 7
Thus, it was only the earlier clause that guaranteed anything like the most
basic interests of citizens of a free society, and even then only between
citizens and foreign states.88 In sum, with the exception of a few enumerated
rights,89 the Constitution nowhere guaranteed anything like basic rights of
free persons to citizens of the United States. Slaughter-House left the
definition and protection of fundamental rights to the discretion of the states.
Thus, although the Slaughter-House Cases did not address the state action
doctrine, that opinion nevertheless precluded the broad reading of "No State
shall" which is a necessary premise for the analysis of the Civil Rights Cases.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause, which Slaughter-House wrung lifeless,
is the natural source of the fundamental interests that "No State shall...
abridge." This is transparently clear from the dissents of both Justices Bradley
and Field to the majority's opinion in Slaughter-House. Both men identified
as among the privileges and immunities meant to be protected by the clause
at least the following: "Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and
to pursue and obtain happiness and safety ... ,,90 Bradley's opinion for the
Civil Rights Cases, in the passages quoted earlier, similarly presupposes a vital
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Among the private invasions, the
87. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74.
88. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV assumed that the states
surely would protect the fundamental interests of their own citizens and therefore
excluded that concern from its ambit. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) at 73-77; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era
of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 889 (1986). See also
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Fifth Amendment not a delegation
of affirmative authority to secure fundamental rights).
89. Of course, nothing in Slaughter-House affected the rights given against the
states in Article I, § 10, cl. 1 against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and the
impairment of contracts.
90. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 117 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823) (No. 3230)). Justice Field used identical language to identify the fundamental
interests to be protected. Id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell,
6 F.Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)(No. 3230)).
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authorization of which would constitute abrogation of a right, was "assault
against the person, or ... murder" and even "slander [of] the good name of
a fellow citizen."'" Indeed, if the Court in the Civil Rights Cases had not
read the Privileges or Immunities Clause broadly, the entire discussion of
invasion and abrogation would have made no sense whatsoever.
Slaughter-House poses a problem for the interpretation given by the Civil
Rights Cases beyond stare decisis. For while Slaughter-House relied in part
on a contrast between the language of the two privileges and immunities
clauses, the greater motivation by far was federalism. To interpret the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as the dissents urged, the majority feared,
would
fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the
control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally
conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character
[and] radically change[ ] the whole theory of the relations of the
State and Federal governments to each other and of both these
governments to the people ...'
Surely the majority is at least partially correct. To interpret the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in this way is to remove from the states discretion that they
enjoyed prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the
Court's parsimonious understanding of the purposes of the Reconstruction
Amendments, simply to eliminate slavery and place the freed slaves on an
equal legal footing with whites,93 there was little reason to believe that the
drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment could have intended
anything so radical. Nonetheless, the majority's interpretation essentially
renders the Privileges or Immunities Clause redundant. It is consistent with
the Supremacy Clause, even in the absence of the Fourteenth Amendment, that
the states were prohibited from taking actions that interfered with the will of
Congress or its relationship to the people.94
91. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17.
92. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
93. Id. at 71 ("We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events,
almost too recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the most
casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be
impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation
of each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean
the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and
the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.").
94. See id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting).
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Is it possible that the Fourteenth Amendment is redundant? Has history
inadvertently given the Civil Rights Cases the neglect it deserves? Perhaps the
answer to the dilemma I identified earlier is that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not provide private accountability for violations of fundamental interests
because it assumes that fundamental interests are already well protected by the
states.95
In the next two sections, I hope to show that is not the case and that
Slaughter-House not only constitutes a radical evisceration of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, as many other scholars have already demonstrated, but
that the Court grossly misunderstood the strategy of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and its effect on federalism. Congress, on the other hand, well
understood what it was about. It acted deliberately to reallocate the definition
of fundamental rights from the states to the Constitution and it did so in a way
that affected federalism only marginally. In fact, the changes introduced by
the Fourteenth Amendment improved on the original institutional strategy,
without changing it goals; in light of the weaknesses which the Civil War
revealed. Thus, my concern is not simply to reiterate the intentions of
Congress, but to demonstrate the soundness of its strategy.
II. FEDERALISM AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
THE FRAMERS' INTENT
A. Protection of Fundamental Rights
and the Constitution of 1789.
Justice Miller was surely correct, in his majority opinion for the
Slaughter-House Cases, that allocating the definition and protection of
fundamental rights to the Constitution represented a substantial reallocation of
power from the original scheme of federalism. Whether the effect was to
"fetter and degrade the State governments" or whether it "radically change[d]
the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each
other and of both these governments to the people"96 is the subject of these
sections. But what is not controversial is that both the Constitution of 1788
and the Bill of Rights three years later left to the states the definition and
protection of most fundamental rights of citizenship. By a fundamental right
of citizenship rights I mean in this context possessed by every citizen which
were to be protected against infringement by anyone, the state or another
private party. According to the natural law theory of the time, these were the
rights for whose protection governments were formed.
95. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22.
96. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873).
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The protection of such rights in the Constitution of 1789 might have
taken any of at least five forms. First, the Constitution might have enumerat-
ed such rights and given jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear cases brought
by private parties against anyone alleged to have violated one of the
enumerated rights. This would have been the strongest protection possible.
As guardian of the Constitution, the Supreme Court would play the central
role in the definition and enforcement of these rights.
Second, somewhat short of this level of protection, the Constitution might
have enumerated fundamental rights, but enjoined the states to protect them.
The actions of the states would then be reviewable by the United States
Supreme Court. The Court's role would again be paramount.
Third, the Constitution might have protected these rights only against
infringement by initiatives of the new federal government and the state
governments, and not against the initiatives of private persons. The protection
of fundamental interests against infringement by private parties would have
been left by default to the discretion of the state governments or perhaps to
the state constitutions.
Fourth, the Constitution might simply have empowered Congress to
define fundamental rights of citizenship and authorized the federal courts to
hear actions involving allegations of infringement by anyone. This would be
both more and less protection than the third alternative. More protection
because at the federal level there would have been protection for fundamental
interests against infringement by anyone. But also less protection, because the
creation of federal rights would have been within the discretion of Congress
and Congress might be more or less capacious than the framers in its
conception of fundamental interests.
Finally, the Constitution might have done no more than constrain the new
government from exercising its own powers in ways that infringed
fundamental interests. This again would have left to the states the discretion
to create rights that might be enforced ubiquitously, but it would also have left
persons with no protection against initiatives of the states themselves.
In fact, the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights adopted a hybrid
strategy in between the third and fifth approaches. In the Articles, but no
where else,97 the Constitution constrained initiatives of the states in violation
of some fundamental interests. Separately from provisions addressed to Con-
gress in Article I, the states were prohibited from passing "any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
97. In Barron v.'Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the Supreme Court
confirmed that the Bill of Rights, as well as the Fifth Amendment, were limitations
only on the national government, and neither empowered the national government to
protect fundamental rights nor limited the states.
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tracts.""8 While the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV99 may
well have been premised upon, and even limited to a set of fundamental rights
of citizenship, it also assumed that the states would protect those rights for
their own citizens. Consequently, it merely assured the citizens of the United
States of treatment in a foreign state equal to that accorded to citizens of the
foreign state.' The emphasis by far, however, was on initiatives of the
new federal government.'0 ' The new Constitution, including the Bill of
Rights, addressed the possibility of abusive initiatives in two ways. First,
under the careful guidance of James Madison, the seven Articles of the
Constitution organized the institutions of the government to minimize the
possibility of radical usurpations. It largely limited the powers of the new
government to the conduct of foreign affairs and the promotion and regulation
of commerce. In the exercise of those powers, the government was further
limited by the prohibitions of Article I, Section 9, against, for instance, the
suspension of habeas corpus, bills of attainder and discrimination in the
regulation of the ports of the various states. Famously, too, the powers of the
new government were separated and assigned to different branches of the
government, and within the Congress, between two distinct houses.0 2
Finally, representation was so arranged, by keeping the ratio of representatives
to citizens large, to "refine" democracy and ensure that only the wisest held
positions of responsibility in the new governments. Madison explained the
operation of this refinement in Federalist No. 10:
The effect of the first difference [between direct democracy and a
representative republic] is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country, and whose patriotism and love ofjustice will be least likely
to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.0 3
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
99. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
100. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
101. The lack of any further constraints on the states is due in part to that fact
that most of the states at the time of the convention had bills of rights within their own
constitutions, thus obviating the need for further constraints at the national level. See
HELEN E. VEIT, ET AL., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, iX-X (1991). In addition, and
perhaps because of the state bills of rights, some also felt that further constraints
represented an undue interference with the powers of the states. Id. at 180.
102. See Garry Wills, Introduction, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS xvi (Garry Wills,
ed., 1982).
103. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 134 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961). See also Wills, supra note 102, at xxi.
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Becausethese representatives would largely be men of property, their presence
in greater numbers would also assure protection of private property, at least
against actions of the federal government."°
The second way in which the Constitution constrained the new govern-
ment was through the direct limitations of the Bill of Rights. Like the
prohibitions of Article I, Section 9, the guarantees of the Bill of Rights further
delimited the already limited powers of Congress.
What is most noteworthy about this scheme for the purposes of this essay
is not what protections were granted but what were left out. The Constitution,
in the Articles and the Bill of Rights, bestowed on the citizens of this country
no legal rights that might be vindicated directly in the federal courts against
private infringement. Nor did the Constitution charge the states with the
protection of fundamental rights against private infringement. Finally,
nowhere did the Constitution give Congress any power through legislation to
define fundamental rights which might be vindicated against private or public
bodies in the federal courts or elsewhere. Fundamental rights, if they were to
be guaranteed, would have to be guaranteed by the states in their constitutions
or by their legislatures.
It would be a serious mistake, though, to regard the Constitution's silence
as reflecting in any way a lack of national commitment to the ideal of
fundamental interests or ambivalence about the role of government in securing
these rights, even if there may not have been a consensus on precisely which
interests were fundamental. 5 Only thirteen years earlier, the Declaration
of Independence had proclaimed that "all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men ... ,."' The Declaration echoed
the arguments of John Locke's Second Treatise on Government:
[A]nd it is not without reason, that [man] seeks out, and is
willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or
104. See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEwORK AND ITS LEGACY
(1990); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987) (book review).
105. See, e.g., Andrew J. Reck, Moral Philosophy and the Framing of the
Constitution, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 23 (Ellen Frankel Paul and Howard Dickman eds., 1989) [hereinafter
FOUNDATIONS]; Michael Kammen, "The Rights of Property, and the Property in
Rights": The Problematic Nature of 'Property' in the Political Thought of the
Founders and the Early Republic, in FOUNDATIONS, supra, at 1.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/1
PRIVATE ACCOUNTABILITY
have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, lib-
erties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
But though men, when they enter into society, give up the
equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature,
into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legisla-
tive, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with
an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty
and property; ... the power of the society, or legislative constituted
by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common
good; but is obliged to secure every man's property .... 107
A belief in the existence of natural moral rights that preceded the
existence of the state and the paramount responsibility of government in
securing and even promoting natural rights, nurtured in large measure by
Locke, was common currency among the delegates to the convention of
1787.08 Three years after the adoption of the Constitution, and expanding
only on the range of rights that he had earlier discussed in Federalist No.
54,109 James Madison wrote:
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well
that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that which the
term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, that
alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man,
whatever is his own .... ,,o
James Wilson, an ally of James Madison and among the most influential of
the delegates to the 1787 convention, had earlier explained in 1790:
"Government, in my humble opinion, should be formed to secure and to
enlarge the exercise of the natural rights of its members; and every
107. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123, 131.
108. On John Locke's influence among the framers, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 8, 283-84 (1969); MORTON
WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978).
109. "Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the
persons, of individuals." THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 372 (James Madison) (Benjamin
F. Wright ed., 1961).
110. James Madison, NATIONAL GAzETTE (March 29,1792), quotedin Kammen,
supra note 105, at 12 (first emphasis added). While the definition of property is
expanded the role of government is the same. Madison's views here resonate of the
earlier view of John Locke.
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government, which has not this in view, as its principal object, is not a
government of the legitimate kind.""'
The absence of ubiquitous protection for fundamental rights in the
Constitution reflected, rather, both the limited purposes of the federal
government and more importantly, as this essay will explore in more detail
later,"' the abiding, and in this case influential, desire of the anti-federalists
to preserve the states as the bulwarks of liberty and natural right. The result
of these intentional omissions was to leave completely to the constitutions of
the states and the discretion of the state legislatures the definition of funda-
mental rights and their protection. The anti-federalist Luther Martin, for
example, argued at the Philadelphia convention:
At the separation from the British gmpire, the people of America
preferred the Establishment of themselves into thirteen separate
sovereignties instead of incorporating themselves into one: to these
they look up for the security of their lives, liberties, & properties:
to these they must look up--The federal Govt. they formed, to
defend the whole agst. foreign nations, in case of war, and to defend
the lesser States agst. the ambition of the larger ....
It was the states that were to do "the primary business that governments
are supposed to do."" 4 Gordon Wood, too, has noted that "[e]ven to some
eager Federalists, the new central government, as much of a consolidation as
it may have been, still seemed to be concerned with 'objects of a general
nature' and calculated to leave the preservation of individual rights to the
states.""' 5 With the relatively few exceptions noted above, and those dealing
with the treatment of foreign citizens, the framers by and large assumed that
the states would sufficiently guaranty individual liberties against all viola-
tions." 6
111. THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 592 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
See also NEDELSKY, supra note 104, at 103 n.39.
112. Infra, part III.
113. See 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 15 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
114. Id. at 15.
115. WOOD, supra note 108, at 536.
116. See Reck, supra note 105, at 30; Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights
and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties
and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REv. 267, 293 (1988).
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B. Fundamental Rights and the
Antebellum Debates"7
The conduct of the southern states, however, leading to secession, during
the Civil War and following it into reconstruction, strained credulity. For
many in the North, including both the radical abolitionists and more moderate
antislavery Republicans, the continued existence of slavery itself belied the
integrity of the southern states to protect the natural rights of persons. Some
located the source of a natural human right to freedom in religion. The
Rockford Register, for example, declared that the equality of man was "a truth
not obvious to the senses, but one that is hidden in God, and revealed to those
only who in all sincerity approach Him.""' Joshua Giddings, abolitionist
congressman from Ohio, held that certain rights are "an element of the human
soul; they cannot be alienated by the individual; nor can any association of
117. The arguments of this section and the next rely greatly on and generally
follow the work of Daniel Farber and John Muench, Robert Kaczorowski, James
Kettner and Eric Foner. See Daniel A. Farber and John E. Muench, The Ideological
Origins of the FourteenthAmendment, 1 CONST. COMM. 235 (1984) [hereinafter Farber
and Muench]; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986) [hereinafter
Kaczorowski]; JAMES H. KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP,
1608-1870 (1978) [hereinafter KETrNER]; ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, AMERICA'S
UNFINISHED REVOLurioN, 1863-1877 (1988) [hereinafter FONER].
My own conclusions from the historical record differ from theirs, however, in a
number of important respects. Professor Farber and Mr. Muench correctly understand
that the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to empower the federal government
to protect the fundamental rights of citizens. They incorrectly assume, as Professor
Kaczorowski notes, that those rights were directed only to initiatives of the states.
Kaczorowski, supra, at 867 n.12 (citing Farber and Muench, supra, at 271 and n.138).
The great value of Professor Kaczorowski's work is to show that the intent was much
broader: it was to reallocate from the states to the federal government the power to
define and protect fundamental rights against invasion by anyone.
Professor Kaczorowski, however, fails to give due regard to desire of the
Republican Congress, arrived at only late in the debates, to place fundamental rights
even beyond the discretion of Congress. He thus incorrectly views the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment as securing principally Congress's authority to protect
fundamental rights. Kaczorowski, supra, at 867. It is one purpose of this article to
show that the definition and protection of fundamental rights is principally in the hands
of the Supreme Court, through the review of state decisions implementing fundamental
rights, with Congress playing a supporting, though nonetheless critical, role.
118. H. PERKINS, NORTHERN EDITORIALS ON SECESSION 505 (1942), quoted in
Farber and Muench, supra note 117, at 248.
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men, or any earthly power, separate the humblest of the human race from
them."" 9
Others worked heroically to find equal natural rights for slaves among the
convictions of the founding fathers. 20 Still others, Lincoln among them,
looked to the Declaration of Independence as the place and time when natural
law principles were secured in the nation's fundamental positive law. In the
campaign of 1858 Lincoln repeatedly attacked Douglas with the high
principles of the Declaration:
I adhere to the Declaration of Independence. If Judge Douglas and
his friends are not willing to stand by it, let them come up and
amend it. Let them make it read that all men are created equal ex-
cept negroes. Let us have it decided whether the Declaration of
Independence, in this blessed year of 1858, shall be thus amend-
ed.'
2 1
Whatever the source of their belief, however, all agreed that the
institution of slavery was a violation of natural law and a violation of the
essential obligations of the southern states to protect the natural rights of all
persons. At the same time as he insisted that slaves shared the same God-
given rights as all humans, Giddings argued that governments were "autho-
rized to legislate only for the protection of the rights which God has conferred
on mankind." 2 1 John Bingham, later to play a central role in giving the
Fourteenth Amendment its final shape, agreed: "[Government's] primal object
must be to protect each human being within its jurisdiction in the free and full
enjoyment of his natural rights."I123
Concern for the protection of fundamental interests was not limited to
slaves, however. Robert Kaczorowski has observed:
Republicans perceived the South as having rejected natural rights in
its assault upon human rights and democratic government. They
119. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 65 (1858), quoted in Farber and
Muench, supra note 117, at 248 n.43.
120. See Farber and Muench, supra note 117, at 248-49.
121. THE POLITICAL DEBATES BETWEEN ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEN A.
DOUGLAS (Part 1) (G. Putnam ed., 1913) 175, quoted in Farber and Muench, supra
note 117, at 250.
122. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 65 (1858), quotedin Farber and
Muench, supra note 117, at 252.
123. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., app. 139 (1857).
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saw the rejection as a threat to American freedom generally, not
merely the freedom of the former slaves."
Antebellum debates in Congress and the debates that presaged passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment are replete with condemnations of Southern violations
of free speech and press and attacks and economic intimidation directed at
abolitionists and federal officers. 5 The Republicans in Congress loudly
denounced the efforts of the proslavery government of Kansas to stifle
antislavery debate. William Seward indicted the Kansas legislature for making
it "a crime to think what one pleased, and to write and print what one
thought."'26 Bingham, too, challenged the Kansas legislature: "Before you
hold this enactment to be law, bum our immortal Declaration and our free-
written Constitution, fetter our free press, and .w. . put out the light of that
understanding which the breath of the Almighty hath kindled."'27 Senator
Wilson included among the evils of slavery violent attacks on abolitionists,
gag orders in Congress, seizure of colored seamen in the South and assaults
on those who attempted to defend them.'28 To the Republicans, the battle
for the South was no less than "a struggle. . . that pitted nationalism and
individual liberty against states' rights and tyranny."'
129
The struggle of North and South, crystallized over slavery and secession,
implicated constitutional issues at the level of its very warp and woof. Did
Congress have the authority to protect southern slaves? Did it have the
authority to intervene between states and their citizens, or between citizens
themselves? These questions were of obvious fundamental relevance when
Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 130 and when Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866.' But the debates over slavery
were not conceptually separate from the battle over secession. In the minds
of both sides, these constitutional issues were philosophically framed in the
terms of even more fundamental questions about sovereignty and allegiance.
The power of a government to determine and defend fundamental rights went
124. Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 879 (citation omitted).
125. See Farber and Muench, supra note 117, at 253, 257; Kaczorowski, supra
note 117, at 875, 877-78, and sources cited therein.
126. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 941 (1858), quoted in Farber and
Muench, supra note 117, at 253.
127. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 124 (1856), quoted in Farber and
Muench, supra note 117, at 253.
128. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1320-21 (1864). See also Farber and
Muench, supra note 117, at 257 and n.94.
129. Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 879.
130. 12 Stat. app. ii (1863).
131. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
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hand in hand with the right to expect the allegiance of the citizenry and both
of those issues were aspects of a government which represented a sovereign
people.' If that sovereign people were the people within their states, then
that government had the duty and the necessary power to define and protect
fundamental interests. It followed too, that those people, through their
governments could determine for themselves whether the conditions of their
confederation had been violated and that they were entitled to depart the
union.'
The resolution of this issue to those involved was a matter of historical
fact: Was the Constitution adopted by one sovereign people, or by thirteen
sovereign peoples? Southern apologists, heirs to the states-rights philosophy
of the Anti-Federalists and the early Republicans, insisted that the Constitution
retained the orientation of the earlier Articles of Confederation. The citizens
of each state, within their states,' retained their sovereignty and Indepen-
dence under the new Constitution. The Constitution created no more than a
federation of the several sovereign states. The federal government was their
agent with limited powers adapted strictly to its narrow purposes. 3 From
the peculiar metaphysics of the time, this view entailed the power in the
people of each state, through their governments, to determine when the com-
pact had been violated and when a state was therefore justified in withdrawing
from the union. 3 On this view too, because the citizens of the states also
owed their principle allegiance to the states as the government of a sovereign
people, it was the states, and not the federal government, which in turn had
the power, and indeed duty, to protect the rights of their citizens. 137 The
Southern ideal of citizens sovereign within their states was reflected
unequivocally in the preamble to the Constitution of the Confederacy framed
soon after secession: "We, the people of the Confederate States, each State
acting in its sovereign and independent character, in order to form a
permanent federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity,
132. See Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 872-73; KETrNER, supra note 117, at
334-51. Sovereignty itself was understood as the preeminent and comprehensive
political power, not just within the scope of particular powers. Lincoln, reflecting the
common understanding, defined sovereignty "'as "a political community without a
political superior.""' Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 873 (citation omitted).
133. KETrNER, supra note 117, at 334-35; Akhil Reed Amar, OfSovereigntyand
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1452-54 (1987); Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at
873.
134. See KETTNER, supra note 117, at 335-51; Amar, supra note 133, at 1452-55.
135. See Amar, supra note 133, at 1452; Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 873
and sources cited therein.
136. KETrNER, supra note 117, at 338.
137. KETrNER, supra note 117, at 338 and sources cited therein; Kaczorowski,
supra note 117, at 873.
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and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity-invoking
the favor and guidance of Almighty God-do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the Confederate States of America."
138
Adhering to the same metaphysical view of sovereignty as entailing
certain necessary features, President Lincoln and northern Republicans differed
from their southern antagonists principally in insisting that sovereignty lay in
the people of the nation as a whole. Indeed, many, including Lincoln, argued
that after 1788, the states had no status outside of the Constitution: "The States
have their status in the Union, and they have no other legal status. If they
break from this, they can do so only against law and by revolution."'139 The
position of the northern Republicans was succinctly summarized by James
Kettner: "Under the Constitution southerners were citizens of the United
States, receiving protection from the national government, owing allegiance
to the supreme law of the land, and legally obliged to submit to the will of the
majority." 40
The terms of this debate, particularly the linkage of sovereignty with
allegiance and allegiance with an obligation to offer protection, may sound
odd to modem ears. We have become inured to legal positivism 4' and
skeptical of arguments from naturally necessary features of abstract legal
notions, notions which are the product of our imaginations and subject to
being reimagined whenever we realize a more useful way of thinking about
our problems. We are less likely to talk in terms of some preeminent
sovereignty and its correlative allegiance and more likely to talk in terms of
particular enumerated or penumbral rights and powers with any conflicts
138. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, Preamble.
See also KETrNER, supra note 117, at 335-36.
139. KETTNER, supra note 117, at 339 (quoting Message to Congress, July 4,
1861).
140. KETrNER, supra note 117, at 340.
141. Even at the time, Antebellum courts were treating natural law claims with
growing caution. See Farber and Muench, supra note 117, at 245-46. Lincoln and
more moderate Republicans embraced natural law merely as interstitial to the law on
the books. Id. at 247 ("For [Lincoln], natural law was like the law of nations,
interstitial and capable of being displaced by positive law."). That belief in part
accounted for the ability of moderate Republicans, like Lincoln, to countenance the
legitimacy of slavery in the South while arguing for its exclusion from the territories.
See also id. at 237, 240. The evolution of the reconstruction amendments itself,
culminating with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, illustrates the tension
between the strong claims of natural lawyers for inherent national powers and the
recognition that the country's positive fundamental law, the Constitution, did not
authorize Congress or the Supreme Court to protect fundamental interests. See supra
text accompanying notes 97-105.
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between exercises of overlapping jurisdiction determined by the supremacy
clause.
The debates, though clearly conducted by -reference to historical
understanding, were shockingly devoid of apparent familiarity, in more than
the vaguest sense, with the discussions of the framers of 1789 on matters of
federalism.'42 Those framers, sensitive to, indeed embroiled in, the demands
of federalism, carefully and intentionally left to the states the principal
authority for determining and defending fundamental rights.'43
Nonetheless, despite their terms, these debates reveal a real and practical
preoccupation with the ability and willingness of the southern states to protect
the fundamental interests of all persons and the necessity, in light of their
failure, to locate such a power in the federal government. On this score,
Robert Kaczorowski has observed that "[tlhe most important question for the
framers was whether the national or the state governments possessed primary
authority to determine and secure the status and rights of American citi-
zens." ' While the outcome of the Civil War, as a practical matter, settled
for the time being the power of the southern states to secede, the debate over
the constitutional authority of the federal government to protect fundamental
interests had only begun.
C. The Reallocation of Power over Fundamental Rights:
The Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866
Even before Lee's surrender at Richmond on April 9, 1865, Republicans
began to lay the foundation for exercising their claimed powers and responsi-
bilities of national sovereignty. In 1864, the Senate approved the Thirteenth
Amendment abolishing slavery.'45 It failed to win the necessary two-thirds
majority in the House and Lincoln made the Amendment a principle issue in
the presidential campaign of that year. Following his reelection, on January
31, 1865, by a margin of slightly over two to one, the House approved the
amendment and it was sent to the states for ratification, which it finally won
in December, 1865. Many Republicans believed that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment alone was sufficient to permit them fully to protect the natural rights
denied to Blacks under slavery. In the Republican linkage of protective power
with allegiance, citizenship was the linchpin. But it was precisely citizenship,
indeed the mere possibility of citizenship, that Justice Taney earlier had denied
142. See Farber and Meunch, supra note 117, at 241 and n.10.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 278-80.
144. Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 866-67.
145. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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to the black race in his infamous opinion in Scott v. Sanford.'46 Were freed
Blacks to be made citizens of the United States, Taney reasoned, "they would
be entitled to all of these privileges and immunities in every State, and the
State could not restrict them; for they would hold these privileges under the
paramount authority of the Federal Government ... .""' Taney, however,
could not believe that the founders had intended the possibility of Blacks
becoming citizens. He wrote that Blacks were "not included, and were not
intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and
[could] therefore, claim none of the rights and privileges which that instru-
ment provides for and secures to the citizens of the United States."'48 He
concluded that Blacks "had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect; and... the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for
his benefit."'49
Though the Thirteenth Amendment by its terms did not grant citizenship
to the slaves freed by its ratification, many in the Republican party felt it was
unnecessary. Citizenship was entailed by the grant of freedom. In the first
federal court decision interpreting the force of the Thirteenth Amendment, 5 '
for example, Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne, relying on many of the
same sources cited by Republican law makers, summarized the Republican
theory of national citizenship incorporated in the amendment. He wrote that
the Thirteenth Amendment "trenches directly upon the power of the states and
of the people of the states."''
Before the Amendment was adopted, "the power [to define the status and
rights of citizenship] belonged entirely to the states."'52  "The Thirteenth
Amendment 'reversed and annulled the original policy of the Constitu-
tion."" 3 Looking to English treatises and the common law of both England
and the United States, he reasoned that "'[t]he term "citizen," as understood
in our law, is precisely analogous to the term subject, in the [English]
146. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1857). For a more thorough discussion of
Dred Scott on these points see Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 886-87, 894-95.
147. DredScott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 423.
148. Id. at 404.
149. Id. at 407.
150. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1867) (No. 16,151).
Rhodes concerned the validity and interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
enacted on the basis of the power granted congress in the second section of the
Thirteenth Amendment. For a more thorough discussion of Rhodes and its
consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at
900-02.
151. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 788.
152. Id. at 790.
153. Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 901 (quoting Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 794).
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common law""54 and, as "[a]ll persons born in the allegiance of the King
are natural born subjects.... [so] all persons born in the allegiance of the
United States are natural born citizens.'"" He concluded, therefore, "that
the emancipation of a native born slave by removing the disability of slavery
made him a citizen. 05
6
Events following the end of hostilities only reinforced the already dire
necessity of federal action if civil rights were to be established in the South.
Eric Foner has written that "[v]irtually from the moment the Civil War ended,
the search began for legal means of subordinating a volatile black population
that regarded economic Independence as a corollary of freedom and the old
labor discipline as a badge of slavery."'57  Local governments adopted
ordinances intended to limit the mobility of blacks and segregate them outside
of towns, except as servants. Calls for state-wide control of black labor
culminated in the enactment of the Black Codes. These laws defined the
rights and powers of the freed slaves. They empowered blacks to acquire
property, marry, enter into contracts, sue and be sued and testify in legal
actions involving other blacks. Their hallmark, however, was the limitations
they placed on the economic options of Blacks. Mississippi required all
Blacks to have, in January of each year, written evidence of employment for
the upcoming year. Any Black who left a job before the expiration of his or
her contract, forfeited wages already earned and was subject to arrest by any
white citizen. South Carolina prohibited Blacks from following any
occupation but that of farmer or servant except by paying a substantial annual
tax. Blacks were required to sign annual contracts that provided for labor
from sunup to sundown and a ban on leaving the plantation without the
154. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 788 (quoting State v. Manuel, 20 N.C (4 Dev. & Bat.)
20, 26 (1839)), cited in Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 901.
155. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 789, cited in Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 901.
156. Id. Based on his interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, Justice
Swayne went so far as to nullify the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 granting
citizenship to the newly freed slaves. He held: "the provision of the [Civil Rights Act
of 1866] conferring citizenship was unnecessary, and is inoperative." Id. Senator
Trumbull, who was later to be a principle proponent of the Civil Rights Act, explained
in a speech following passage of the Act that "[i]t was the generally received opinion
that, after the adoption of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery, all native-
born persons were citizens.... [Therefore,] every inhabitant of the land has secured
to him all the rights pertaining to citizenship." Collected in Scrapbook in the Civil
Rights Bill 79 (E. McPherson ed., n.d.), in EDwARD MCPHERSON PAPERS container 99
(collection available in the Library of Congress), quoted in Kaczorowski, supra note
117, at 897 n.153.
157. FONER, supra note 117, at 198.
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permission of the employer. Vagrancy laws applied to unemployed Blacks
and permitted as punishment involuntary labor on the plantations. 5
At about this same time the Ku Klux Klan emerged as a loosely-knit
"military force serving the interests of the Democratic party, the planter class,
and all those who desired the restoration of white supremacy." 59 Its goal
was to reverse the changes wrought by Reconstruction: "to destroy the
Republican party's infrastructure, undermine the Reconstruction state,
reestablish control of the black labor force, and restore racial subordination in
every aspect of Southern life."" Though often indiscriminate in its vicious-
ness,161 the Klan particularly selected as its targets blacks who had achieved
a semblance of success, either economic or political, as well as the institutions
that promoted black economic and political development. The Republican
party was a common target, but so were schools, churches and even
individuals who treated blacks as ordinary citizens. Typical of the thousands
of Klan attacks on black and white citizens, in Jackson County, Florida, the
Klan murdered 150 people, among them black leaders and a Jewish merchant
named Samuel Fleischman, who was "resented for his Republican views and
reputation for dealing fairly with black customers."'162  T h e K I a n
conducted its reign of terror virtually beyond the control of local or state
governments.1 63 Indeed, the very point of Klan activity, to many, was "to
defy the reconstructed State Governments, to treat them with contempt, and
show that they have no real existence."'" Professor Foner observes that only
where southern governors were able to draw on large populations of white
Republicans were they able to take forceful actions against the Klan. 65
Relying on the newly-ratified Thirteenth Amendment and the expansive
Republican theory of national citizenship and national civil rights power that
informed it, the Thirty-Ninth Congress assumed as its foremost and immediate
task the establishment of federal protections for fundamental civil rights.'66
158. Id. at 198-200.
159. Id. at 425.
160. Id. at 426.
161. In South Carolina, for instance, the day after Republicans won substantial
political power in Laurens County, bands of whites drove 150 freedmen from their
homes and murdered thirteen people. Among the victims were the newly elected white
probate judge, a black legislator and others prominently connected with politics. Id.
at 427-28.
162. Id. at 431.
163. See id. at 438.
164. Id. at 444 (quoting a former Confederate officer).
165. Id. at 439-40.
166. See Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 893 (citing remarks of Shuyler Colfax,
Speaker of the House of Representatives opening the Thirty-ninth Congress).
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Soon after Congress convened in January, 1886, Lyman Trumball, chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee introduced two bills. The first was intended to
extend the life of the Freedman's Bureau. It would have provided for direct
federal funding of the Bureau and permitted agents of the Bureau to assume
jurisdiction of cases involving blacks as well as to punish state officials who
denied Blacks equal civil rights.
The second, and by far the more important of the two, was the Civil
Rights bill. 67 The language of the bill was a clear reaffirmation of the
broad Republican principles of national citizenship and the rights that attend
it:
All persons born in the United States, and not subject to any
foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to
be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and
color.., shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in
the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property as is enjoyed by white citizens .... "
Many Republican proponents of the bill believed that the it did no more than
restate what was implicit in the Thirteenth Amendment. Justice Noah Swayne
went so far in his opinion in United States v. Rhodes,'69 discussed earlier,
as to hold the citizenship provision redundant and of no effect. 7
All parties to the debates, those for and against the Act, were in
agreement about the radical nature of its claimed authority.'' The Civil
167. The bill which became the Civil Rights Act, introduced by Senator
Trumbull, was presaged by a bill introduced even earlier in the Thirty-Ninth Congress,
before final ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, by Senator Henry Wilson of
Massachusetts. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865). Senator Wilson's
bill was premised on the Emancipation Proclamation and therefore limited to
protecting the rights of the former slaves in states that had been in rebellion.
Consideration of this bill was postponed until after the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment when legislation could be adopted to protect all persons in the United
States. See Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 895.
168. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
169. 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1867) (No. 16,151).
170. See supra note 156.
171. This is not to suggest that there were no disagreements even within the
Republican party. The radical wing of the party differed from the moderates primarily
with respect to the rights and benefits to be extended to the freed slaves. The radicals,
the much smaller group, would have extended suffrage and made available to the ex-
slaves substantial amounts of land. The amount of land finally made available was
only a fraction of that proposed and suffrage was forced to await the passage of the
[Vol. 59
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Rights bill took from the states the power to define and protect the fundamen-
tal rights of citizenship, now associated with preeminent national citizenship
rather than state citizenship. Senator Trumbull, introducing his bill, explained
that the bill sought to secure
the liberty which a person enjoys in society .... [T]he liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, that is the liberty which was intended
to be secured by the Declaration of Independence and the Con-
stitution of the United States originally, and more especially by the
Amendment which has recently been adopted.'
Following President Johnson's veto of the Act, Senator Trumbull urged its re-
enactment by drawing on the familiar Republican connection between
allegiance and protection:
How is it that every person born in these United States owes
allegiance to the Government? Everything that he is or has, his
property and his life, may be taken by the Government of the United
States in its defense . . . and can it be that . . . we have got a
Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of the
citizen, but has not power to afford him protection? Is that all that
this boasted American citizenship amounts to?... Sir, it cannot be.
Such is not the meaning of our Constitution. Such is not the
meaning of American citizenship. This Government, which would
go to war to protect its meanest-I will not say citizen-inhabitant
... in any foreign land whose rights were unjustly encroached upon,
has certainly some power to protect its own citizens in their own
country. Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights."'
Fifteenth Amendment. See FONER, supra note 117, at 239-43. On the points
discussed in the text, radicals and moderates were in agreement. See id. at 242-43.
172. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
173. Id. at 1757. In a speech made that same year, Senator Trumbull returned
to this theme with heart-rending force:
It cannot be that we have constituted a government . . . which is all-
powerful to command the obedience of the citizen but has no power to
afford him protection .... Tell it not, sir, ... to the father whose son was
starved at Andersonville, or the widow whose husband was slain at Mission
Ridge, or the little boy who leads his sightless father through the streets of
your city, or the thousand other mangled heroes to be seen on every side
of us to-day, that this Government, in defense of which the son and the
husband fell, the father lost his sight and the others were maimed and
crippled, had the right to call these persons to its defense, but now has no
power to protect the survivors or their friends in any rights whatever in the
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In the House, Representative Broomall struck the same chord:
But throwing aside the letter of the constitution, there are
characteristics of Governments that belong to them as such, without
which they would cease to be Governments. The rights and duties
of allegiance and protection are corresponding rights and duties
.... [Wherever] I owe allegiance to my country, there it owes me
protection, and wherever my Government owes me no protection I
owe it no allegiance and can commit no treason.
Broomall scoffed at the notion that the states were the proper guarantors of
such protection, because, he argued, "everybody knows that the rights and
immunities of citizens were habitually and systematically denied in certain
States to the citizens of other States: the right of speech, the right of transit,
the right to domicile, the right to sue, the writ of habeas corpus, and the right
to petition."'75
Opponents of the bill appreciated the expansiveness of the powers that
Republicans were claiming, though they may have exaggerated its affect on
federalism for their own purposes. "6 In vetoing the Act, President Johnson
warned that it represented
an absorption and assumption of power by the General Government
which, if acquiesced in, must sap and destroy our federative system
of limited powers, and break down the barriers which preserve the
rights of the States. It is another step, or rather stride, toward
centralization and the concentration of all legislative powers in the
National Government. 77
Senator Garret Davis of Kentucky feared that "[t]he principles involved in this
bill, if they are legitimate and constitutional, would authorize Congress to pass
States. Such, sir, is not the meaning of our Constitution; such is not the
meaning of American citizenship. Allegiance and protection are reciprocal
rights.
2 J. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 177-178 (1886), quoted in Farber and
Muench, supra note 117, at 269 n.133.
174. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866).
175. Id.
176. Eric Foner has noted the difficulty of interpreting the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment precisely because the most expansive readings of that
Amendment were offered by its opponents and denied by its proponents. FONER,
supra note 117, at 256.
177. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1681 (1866).
[Vol. 59
40
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/1
PRIVATE ACCOUNTABILITY
civil and criminal codes for every State of the Union."'78 These fears were
repeated by others, including the New York Times which condemned the
Republican understanding of Congressional authority under the Thirteenth
Amendment as "a principle so pregnant with danger to the rightful authority
and jurisdiction of States, that it more than justifies the position assumed by
President Johnson."'
179
President Johnson's veto of both the Freedmen's Bureau and the Civil
Rights bills stunned the Republican majority. Illinois Congressman Shelby
Cullom recalled later that "[a] veto at that time was almost unheard of."8
Both bills were later enacted over the president' veto, the Civil Rights Act in
April and a version of the Freedmen's Bureaus bill in July.
The veto of these bills brought home to the Republicans the importance
of placing national civil rights into the Constitution, beyond the possibility of
future presidential vetoes,' and beyond any doubts as to their connection
to national citizenship. In April, 1866, before Congress took up the vetoed
Civil Rights bill, Congressman John Bingham of Ohio introduced a proposed
constitutional amendment, the precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment. It
provided:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property.'82
The majority of Republicans believed that Congress already had the power
purportedly granted by the proposed amendment. Bingham disagreed.
Bingham earlier had opposed adoption of the Civil Rights bill because he be-
lieved that enforcement of civil rights lay with the states. The Thirteenth
Amendment, while barring slavery, and embracing the freedmen as citizens,
did not change the original allocation of power between the federal govern-
ment and the states.' For Bingham, another amendment was necessary.
Debate on Bingham's proposed amendment was brief. Its proponents
were concerned about the possibility of future presidential vetoes. Many who
178. Id. at 1414.
179. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1866, at 4, col. 3, quoted in Kaczorowski, supra note
117, at 905 n.194.
180. SHELBY M. CULLOM, FIFTY YEARS OF PUBLIC SERVICE 150 (1911).
181. See FONER, supra note 117, at 251.
182. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-34 (1866).
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were confident of the legitimacy of the Civil Rights Act, nonetheless, were
willing to preclude all doubt by clearly articulating the basis of congressional
authority to protect national civil rights. At the same time, Republicans were
also beginning to realize that an additional consequence of extending citizen-
ship to the freedman was to increase the number of southern representatives
in Congress once the southern states were readmitted. Prior to the war, only
three-fifths of the slaves had been counted in calculating Congressional
representation. As freedmen, all would be counted. Without suffrage for the
freed slaves, a move which seemed unlikely at the time, southern representa-
tives, in league with northern democrats, could control Congress.'84
Congressman Giles Hotchkiss of New York summarized the sentiments of
those who foresaw the possibility of southern domination of a not-to-distant
Congress:
This amendment provides that Congress may pass laws to enforce
these rights. Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution
that no State shall discriminate against any class of its citizens; and
let that amendment stand as a part of the organic law of the land,
subject only to be defeated by another constitutional amendment.
We may pass laws here to-day, and the next Congress may wipe
them out.'
Early in March, the House voted, with nearly all Republicans in favor,
including Bingham, to postpone consideration of the proposed amendment.
On April 9, 1866, the House overrode the President's veto of the Civil Rights
bill and it became law. Near the end of April, the Joint Committee reported
the revised, proposed Fourteenth Amendment to Congress.'8 6 The new
amendment contained five sections. The first section was an amended version
of Congressman Bingham's original proposal. The second required a
reduction in the basis of representation in proportion to the number of males
denied the right to vote. The third section excluded from the privilege of
voting in federal elections those who participated in the insurrection against
the federal government. The fourth prohibited payment of the Confederate
debt and the fifth gave Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the
amendment through "appropriate" legislation.
184. See FONER, supra note 117, at 252-255; Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at
910.
185. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866), quoted in Farber and
Muench, supra note 117, at 271.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/1
PRIVATE ACCOUNTABILITY
With the exception of the first clause of section one, added on the floor
of the Senate, which explicitly granted citizenship to all native born persons,
section one (also drafted by Congressman Bingham) was similar to Bingham's
original proposal and passed without change:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
The difference between the earlier version and that adopted by Congress was
that the earlier version read as a grant of power to Congress and the revised
version as the imposition of a duty on the states, a duty not to abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizenship. The effect of the change was to make
the rights self-executing and under the protection of the federal courts as well
as Congress.
Once again, debate on the substance of section one in both House and
Senate was brief and paralleled consideration of Congressman Bingham's
original proposal.'87 Thaddeus Stevens, who 'introduced the Amendment in
the House, urged adoption to avoid repeal of the Civil Rights Act when the
South was once again represented in Congress.'88 Some urged adoption to
remove doubt about the legitimacy of the Act. Congressman Broomall, for
instance, who himself had no doubts as to the constitutionality of the Act,
explained his support for the amendment:
[t]he fact that all who will vote for the pending measure, or whose
votes are asked for it, voted for this proposition in another shape, in
the civil rights bill, shows it will meet the favor of the House. It
may be asked, why should we put a provision in the Constitution
which is already contained in an act of Congress? The gentleman
from Ohio [Mr. Bingham] ... says the act is unconstitutional....
[W]hile I differ from him upon the law, yet it is not with that
certainty of being right that would justify me in refusing to place the
power to enact the law unmistakably in the Constitution. On so
vital a point I wish to make assurance doubly sure.'89
187. Most of the discussion focused on sections two and three concerning the
basis of representation and eligibility for federal office. See Farber and Muench, supra
note 117, at 272.
188. See Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 910.
189. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2498 (1866), quoted in Kaczorowski,
supra note 117, at 911.
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Others regretted the absence from the Amendment of suffrage for the
freedmen. Representative Garfield summarized the belief of the radical
Republicans "that the right to vote.... is so necessary to the protection of
... natural rights as to be indispensable, and therefore equal to natural
rights. 1190
Discussion of the precise rights that section one was to protect was also
brief and conducted in the most general terms. Certainly, as Congressman
Broomall's remarks attest Republicans meant to legitimize the Civil Rights
Act and in doing so embraced among the rights secured by the Amendment
all those mentioned in the Act: The right to hold and convey property, to
enforce contracts, to sue and be sued. It is significant, though, that the
Amendment, befitting organic law, speaks in much more general terms than
the statute, suggesting that the Amendment included a broader and more
dynamic scope than the Act.'9 '
Clearly, too, the Republicans meant to abolish the Black Codes. In
opening the House debate, Representative Stevens declared that the first
section established the principle that state laws "shall operate equally upon
all."' Similarly, Senator Howard, later introducing the Amendment to the
Senate summarily explained that the Equal Protection Clause would abolish
all "class legislation in the States and [do] away with the injustice of
subjecting one class of persons to a code not applicable to another."'193
Many proponents of the Amendment understood it to incorporate the first
eight Amendments to the Bill of Rights and to make their guarantees
applicable against the states. Senator Howard, for instance, acknowledged that
the Bill of Rights applied only to Congress and not the states. He declared
that under the Amendment, the states could no longer violate the liberties that
the Bill of Rights had secured against the federal government; with the rati-
fication of the Amendment the states would have to respect "the personal
rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight Amendments."'94  Senator
Bingham, the author of the Amendment explained that the privileges and
immunities he had in mind were largely defined by the first eight Amend-
ments to the Constitution. 95
The rights encompassed by the Amendment were not exhausted by the
Bill of Rights, however. The Bill of Rights contained no equal protection
190. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866), quoted in Farber and
Muench, supra note 117, at 272.
191. See FONER, supra note 117, at 257-58.
192. Quoted in id. at 254 (emphasis in original).
193. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866).
194. Quoted in FONER, supra note 117, at 258. See also Farber and Muench,
supra note 117, at 273.
195. See Farber and Muench, supra note 117, at 271-72.
[Vol. 59
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/1
PRIVATE ACCOUNTABILITY
clause; it did not guarantee rights to own and dispose of property, to contract
or to sue and be sued, as did the Civil Rights Act.'96 Senator Howard
discussed the Bill of Rights only in addition to the privileges and immunities
of citizenship, which, he remarked, "are not and cannot be defined in their
entire extent and nature."'197 To "gather some intimation of what probably
will be the opinion of the judiciary,"'98 he quoted at length from the opinion
in Corfield v. Coryell'99 which had given the Comity Clause of Article IV
a natural rights interpretation. In Corfield, Justice Washington had declared
that the Comity Clause protects "those privileges and immunities which are,
in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free
governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the
several states . . . ." Among those rights were "[p]rotection by the govern-
ment; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety .... "
Professor Foner attributes that brevity of the debate over section one to
the fact that these principles had guided the Republicans already for years.
"[T]he principle of equal rights," he observed:
was now so widely accepted in Republican circles, and had already
been so fully discussed, that compared with the now-forgotten
disqualification and representation clauses, the first section inspired
relatively little discussion. It was "so just," a moderate congressman
declared, "that no member of this House can seriously object to
it.,,20o
This is surely the case. Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment represented
only the culmination of the long painful struggle to determine the character
of national citizenship, a struggle whose terms were laid down as well in the
debates over secession. To whom did citizens of the United States owe their
primary allegiance, to the states or the national government? The answer to
196. See note 131, supra.
197. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2765-66 (1866).
198. Id. at 2765.
199. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
200. FONER, supra note 117, at 257 (quotation not attributed). In the same vein
see Farber and Muench, supra note 117:
The nature and source of [the fundamental rights to be protected by the
fourteenth amendment] had been discussed by Republicans since the party
was formed in the 1850's, and had received intensive consideration in
Congress at least since the debates on the thirteenth amendment. Congress-





Madry: Madry: Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
MISSOUR LA W REVIEW
that question would determine whether the states could secede and on which
government rested the responsibility of protecting fundamental rights of
citizenship.
The Northern victory did not settle this question, and could not
reasonably have been expected to; no war can ever settle any matter of
principle. It required the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish slavery. In the
Republican theory of preeminent national sovereignty, the emancipation of the
slaves also, without more, extended to the freed slaves the basis of federal
protection, federal citizenship. Congress exercised its inherent powers of
protection for the first time in the Civil Rights Act. With the Fourteenth
Amendment, the evolution was brought to completion. The Republican theory
of national citizenship and federal power to protect fundamental rights was
enacted into positive law. "Republicans generally believed that fundamental
rights already existed, at least as a matter of natural law and the law of
nations, and that Congress probably already possessed the power to protect
these rights. The fourteenth amendment was merely designed to perfect that
protection."' Therefore, despite the brevity of discussion over the char-
acter of fundamental rights, the background of Republican thought gives
considerable insight into the nature of the rights, at least in broad terms, that
Republicans hoped to see secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, and in
particular the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Most importantly for the
present discussion, the evidence demonstrates that far more was intended than
simply protection against state violation of fundamental rights, interference
with speech, assembly, the free exercise of one's religion, the sort of
protections envisioned by the first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights.
To return to Justice Bradley's distinction in the Civil Rights Cases, the
Amendment also addressed the abrogation of rights, the failure of the state to
protect citizens against the violation of their natural rights by other
persons."'
This is evident in the first instance from the commitment of Republican
theory to natural law. In natural law theory, at least as far back as John
Locke, the very reason that people left the state of nature and entered into
civil society was to secure their safety and the safety of their possessions and
livelihood: "The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation
of their flives, liberties and estates]. To which in the state of nature there are
many things wanting."2 3 This idea was echoed repeatedly in the declara-
tions of Republican congressmen, often by reference to the Declaration of
201. Farber and Muench, supra note 117, at 269.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
203. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 124 (C.B. McPherson
ed., 1980) (3d ed. 1698) (emphasis in original).
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Independence. The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that "to secure
these [inalienable] rights, governments are instituted among men .... "
Republicans aggrandized this power and responsibility to the national
government. Congressman Wilson, for instance, thus explained his support
for the Civil Rights bill:
Before our Constitution was formed, the great fundamental rights
which I have mentioned, belonged to every person who became a
member of our great national family. No one surrendered a jot or
tittle of those rights by consenting to the formation of the Govern-
ment.... Upon this I rest my justification of this bill. I assert that
we possess the power to do those things which Governments are
organized to do; that we may protect a citizens of the United States
against a violation of his right ...."
For at least a general taxonomy of those rights, Republicans regularly
referred to the Supreme Courts opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, which gave a
natural rights interpretation to the Comity Clause of Article IV. In that
opinion, Justice Washington listed first among the natural rights of citizens
"[p]rotection by the government."20 s
That the protection was not simply against initiatives of government is
evident from the fact that the Comity Clause refers to the natural rights which
the states themselves owe to citizens. Thus each state owes a duty of
protection, not logically against itself, but against the actions of other persons.
The debates between Republicans and Democrats, northern and southern,
were over the allocation of that basic obligation of government described by
Locke and referred to in the Declaration of Independence and Corfield: the
power to secure citizens in the enjoyment of their lives, liberty and posses-
sions against all invasion. The failure to honor that duty constitutes an
abrogation of the privileges and immunities of citizenship.
It is inconceivable that the majority of justices who endorsed the opinion
in the Slaughter-House Cases were unaware of this history. Until that
opinion, federal judges and federal officers widely assumed that the Fourteenth
Amendment was informed by the Republican theory of national citizenship
204. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1119 (1866). See also Kaczorowski,
supra note 117, at 891-93.
205. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
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and national protection." 6 In United States v. Hall,07 future Supreme
Court Justice William Woods explained at length:
By the original constitution citizenship in the United States was a
consequence of citizenship in a state. By [the citizenship clause of
the fourteenth amendment] this order of things is reversed. Citi-
zenship in the United States is defined; it is made independent of
citizenship in a state, and citizenship in a state is a result of
citizenship in the United States. So that a person born or natu-
ralized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, is,
without reference to state constitutions or laws, entitled to all the
privileges and immunities secured by the constitution of the United
States to citizens thereof.08
Only weeks before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the Slaughter-
House Cases, sitting on circuit, Supreme Court Justice Strong had declared
that the Civil War Amendments were "manifestly intended to secure the right
guaranteed by them against infringement from any quarter."
209
U.S. courts convicted hundreds of individual Klansmen under the
Enforcement Act of 1870210 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871211 "for
violating citizen's rights to life and property, to freedom of speech and
assembly, to keep and bear arms, to equal protection of the laws, and to
vote." '212 This would have been impossible under Slaughter-House yet
federal courts upheld the constitutionality of both of these acts. Slaughter-
House "precluded the national government from protecting citizens in the
South during the 1874 revival of political terrorism, and from preventing the
establishment of a pattern of domination by Southern Conservative Democrats
and white supremacists over Southern blacks and white Republicans."" 3
206. See generally Kaczorowski, supra note 117, 917-22 for an exhaustive
discussion. Professor Kaczorowski concludes that "[flederal judges and legal officers,
like Republican congressman, interpreted the fourteenth amendment as a delegation of
primary authority to enforce civil rights, regardless of the source of the infringement."
Id. at 917.
207. 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
208. Id. at 81.
209. United States v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324, 1326 (C.C.D. Del. 1873) (No.
15,210).
210. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
211. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
212. Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 920-21.
213. Id. at 938.
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The implication of this history for the contemporary state action doctrine
is obvious. It is not the case, as the Court talismanically intones, that the
Fourteenth Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful."214  On the contrary, it erects the
states as shields against violations of fundamental rights, to be defined and
protected ultimately by the Supreme Court. Or as Justice Bradley succinctly
explained in the Civil Rights Cases, "Positive rights and privileges are
undoubtedly secured by the 14th Amendment; but they are secured by way of
prohibition against state laws and state proceedings affecting those rights and
privileges .. .."215
In keeping with the scheme of self-executing rights envisioned in the
amended and adopted section 1, at least one mechanism for the protection of
fundamental rights, against private encroachment presumably was to be
Supreme Court review of state court decisions in actions brought by
individuals to vindicate their rights. The self-executing rights of section 1
were to be available regardless of the availability of any other legislative
protection that Congress might later provide, or more importantly, fail to
provide under section 5.216 Judicial review of state court decisions was an
obvious and simple extension of the long-standing role of the Supreme Court.
But it is clear that the 39th Congress intended Congress to play, or at least
have the power to play, a substantial role in the protection of fundamental
rights. Indeed, as we've seen, one of the purposes for the introduction of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to legitimate the Civil Rights Act of 1866, an Act
in which the Republican dominated Congress took the unprecedented and
presumptuous step of defining in broad detail what it took to be at least some
of the fundamental rights of citizenship.
It is fairly clear, in addition, that Congress intended its role and its
powers to include opening the federal courts to actions directly against private
parties who would violate the fundamental natural rights that the states in the
first instance were charged to protect under the privileges or immunities
clause. Within three years of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,217 Congress adopted the Enforcement Act of 1870218 and the Ku
214. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). See supra text accompanying
notes 16-22.
215. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). See supra text accompanying notes 71-84.
216. Section 5 reads in its entirety: "The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5. See supra text accompanying notes 182-85.
217. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868, with the
ratification by South Carolina.
218. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
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Klux Klan Act of 1871.29 Both statutes criminalized the violation of civil
rights and provided the U.S. attorneys with the means to largely cripple the
Ku Klux Klan." The Ku Klux Klan Act, in addition, created private causes
of action against private defendants to be vindicated by actions in the federal
courts. Though moribund for nearly ninety years following Slaughter-House,
that section, now known as 42 U.S.C. section 1983, with only minor
amendments is today the principle vehicle for priate civil rights enforcement
in the federal courts.22" ' It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.'
The combination of the powers assumed by Congress in the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Enforcement and Ku Klux Klan Acts raised difficult and
anxious questions at the time about the scope of Congress's power under the
very vague section 5.' The relationship between the power of the Supreme
Court and the power of Congress was also unclear. If the rights created by
the Fourteenth Amendment were meant to be self-executing, then why was it
necessary or even useful to grant to Congress any role at all? If private rights
219. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
220. See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at
79-134 (1985) [hereinafter KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS]; Kaczorowski, supra note 117,
at 920.
221. The reinvigoration of § 1983 had to await the Supreme Court's decision in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), in which the Court permitted an action by the
victim of an unreasonable search against the police officers who conducted the search.
The Court first permitted a § 1983 action against a purely private defendant in Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). It was preceded, however, by Jones v.
Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968), which permitted an action against a private defendant
under the similar provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1982. For a thorough discussion of the revival of § 1983 and the contemporary
accretions which have engulfed it, see SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (3d ed. 1991); A SECTION
1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ANTHOLOGY (Sheldon H. Nahmod ed., 1993).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
223. See infra text accompanying notes 235-50.
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were intended when necessary to protect natural rights, could not the Supreme
Court simply imply a cause of action directly from the guarantees of section
1 as it would later imply a cause of action against federal agents in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics?224 Looking
from the other direction, if Congress reserved for itself some significant role
in the protection of civil rights, then what does that mean for the self-
executing nature of section 1? These problems were never resolved but were
merely mooted by the Court's decision in Slaughter-House.
Many of these same issues surface again, however, with the Court's
fabrication of the modem state action doctrine and its alchemical transforma-
tion of private parties into public agents. Now however, the issues are
horribly obscured by the incoherence of the doctrine itself. Many of these
problems are therefore greatly clarified, if not perfectly resolved, by
considering them in light of the historical background, absent Slaughter-House
and the befuddlement of contemporary doctrine. Others, however, remain
obscure because of the obscurity surrounding the original strategy of en-
forcement. The following section takes up briefly those concerns and the
resolution suggested by the historical context.
III. CONGRESS, THE COURTS, THE STATES AND
PRIVATE ACCOUNTABILITY
Contemporary state action doctrine deals as uneasily with the role of
Congress under section 5 as it does with the applicability of the Fourteenth
Amendment to private initiatives. The most important congressional
contribution to civil rights enforcement under the Fourteenth Amendment
remains the provision of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 quoted earlier. It
generously grants to any party against any person a cause of action in the
federal courts for the violation of any right secured by the Constitution."
Under contemporary doctrine, however, this generous grant runs head-long
into the basic premise that the Fourteenth Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct. Thus construed, the Fourteenth Amendment creates
rights only between the states and persons. Consequently no person can ever
be held accountable under section 1983 because no person can ever violate a
right secured by the Amendment.
The Court never has confronted this problem directly. The reason is
attributable again to the judicial alchemy that transforms private initiatives into
state action and private parties into state agents. Once a private defendant is
transformed by the alchemy of the state action doctrine, the private, now
224. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
225. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
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public defendant fits within any proscription aimed exclusively at public
parties.
This is precisely the strategy that the Court adopted in addressing a
related issue in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,26 Lugar was a section 1983
action brought by a private debtor against a private creditor alleging a
deprivation of due process in the execution of a statutorily permitted
prejudgment attachment. The issue in Lugar involved the relationship
between the requirements of the state action doctrine and the additional
condition of section 1983 that the violation be "under color of' state law. The
court of appeals had held that a private party acts under color of state law
only when the private party usurps or corrupts a public official or where
judicial power has been surrendered to the private party.2 ' This reading
of section 1983 treats private parties more candidly as private parties and
requires a greater degree of public character than does the Court's state action
doctrine. To read section 1983 in this way, however, obviously introduces a
substantial degree of incoherence and arbitrariness into the relationship
between section 1983 and state action.
The Supreme Court rejected this approach and instead relied almost
completely on the fiction of state action to make private parties into public
actors. 8 Absent immunities, public defendants act under color of state law
whenever they act in their official capacities, even if the conduct itself is not
authorized by state law. 9 Consequently, if a private defendant is trans-
formed into a public agent, the discrepancy created by the court of appeals
disappears. The same move resolves the discrepancy in holding private parties
liable for violations of public rights.
Apart from the fact that it is infected by the mystery of state action, this
strategy also, however, has the effect of making section 1983, indeed any role
for Congress, potentially redundant or at best marginal. As public agents,
private parties who satisfy the state action requirement presumably should be
liable to private plaintiffs in the federal courts, even absent enabling
legislation by Congress, under the same theory the Court adopted in
Bivens."3 There the Court reasonably permitted a cause of action for
damages directly under the Constitution when necessary to vindicate
226. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
227. Id. at 926.
228. Id. at 937-38.
229. Id. at 929-30 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941):
"[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color
of' state law.") See generally Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110 (1981).
230. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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constitutional guarantees. This approach in the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment is altogether consistent with the intention of the 39th Congress
that the guarantees of section 1 be self-executing, that they provide protection
even in the absence of congressional action under section 5."
Under Bivens, the courts are to refrain from a Bivens-type action for
damages only when Congress has created an alternative remedy. 2
Originally, the Court withheld a Bivens damages remedy, because unnecessary,
only when the remedy provided by Congress was equally effective. Since
Bivens, however, the Court has retreated from that principle and now refuses
a damages action whenever Congress has made available some relief even if
not equal to the damages remedy. If an approach similar to the original
strategy of Bivens were to be followed in case of the Fourteenth Amendment
and private defendants, the role of the Court would be to set minimal
standards for a constitutional remedy. Congress could, if it chose, merely
create even greater remedies for private plaintiffs. Under this stratagem, the
role of Congress would be truly marginal. If the experience with Bivens is
any indication, Congress would likely not even exercise such a power.l 3
If the Court were to follow the more recent doctrine, then the role of
Congress would be substantially greater but the overall affect would be a
perversion of constitutional guarantees as serious as under Bivens itself. 4
The Court would have permitted the devaluation of constitutional rights and
in doing so abdicated its role as the guarantor of those rights. Fortunately, if
the Court were to adopt today an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
along Bivens lines, the extant congressional action would be section 1983 and
its open damages remedy. Nonetheless, the constitutional principle of self-
executing rights would have been compromised to the extent that Congress
had the power to determine the extent of an adequate remedy.
The deliberations of 1866 and the historical concerns and conceptions that
motivated the Fourteenth Amendment resolve many of these incoherences.
Some, however, remain nonetheless adrift in the failure of the 39th Congress
231. In the context of a revived Privileges or Immunities Clause, actions against
private parties may be conditioned upon the unavailability of adequate state remedies.
See infra text accompanying note 252. This condition is distinct, however, from the
condition that Congress as well has failed to provide a remedy for the private violation
of rights secured by the constitution. Under current interpretations of § 1983, an
adequate state remedy precludes an action under § 1983. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 542 (1981).
232. See generally David C. Nutter, Note, Two Approaches to Determine
Whether an Implied Cause of Action under the Constitution is Necessary: The
Changing Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 GA. L. REv. 683 (1985).
233. Though a number of federal statutes provide partial relief, none provides a
remedy as effective as a Bivens action. See id. at 685.
234. See id. at 713-16.
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to address thoroughly the strategy for federal protection of fundamental rights.
The failure of the Republican Congress was not for lack of opportunity.
Democratic opponents to the Thirteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of
1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly assailed the presumptuous-
ness of Congress and decried the effect of federal enforcement of civil rights
on the traditional division of federalism. President Johnson in a memorandum
accompanying his veto of the Civil Rights Act warned that the proposed
statute would affect
an absorption and assumption of power by the General Government
which, if acquiesced in, must sap and destroy our federative system
of limited powers and break down the barriers which preserve the
rights of the states. It is another step, or rather stride, toward
centralization and the concentration of all legislative powers in the
National Government."5
Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky similarly complained that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 "would wholly absorb all reserved state sovereignty and
rights.""n6 He insisted that "the ordinary administration of criminal and civil
justice, which is the immediate and visible guardianship of life and proper-
ty... belong exclusively to the States." 7  Davis feared that "[t]he
principles involved in this bill, if they are legitimate and constitutional, would
authorize Congress to pass civil and criminal codes for every State of the Un-
ion." Many others, in and out of Congress, echoed these same themes of
federal usurpation, destruction of states rights and unlimited powers inCongress."
The sincerity of these declarations and the reasonableness of the fears
they express are difficult to judge. They were made, after all, by opponents
of change who were eager to discredit the Republican proposals. 2 ° Nonethe-
less, these concerns were not without some basis in Republican theory and
action. In the Republican theory of national citizenship, there was no greater
attention paid to separation of powers within the federal government then there
was paid to the founders' theory of federalism. Declarations that federal
citizenship was primary were invariably accompanied by an assumption that
235. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1681 (1866), quoted in Kaczorowski,
supra note 117, at 904.
236. Id. at 183-84, quoted in Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 904.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1414, quoted in Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 904-05.
239. See generally FONER, supra note 117, at 258-60; Farber and Muench, supra
note 117, at 270-72; Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 905-09.
240. See FONER, supra note 117, at 256.
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Congress had the power and duty to protect the fundamental rights of that
citizenship.24 Professor Kaczorowski, among the most careful interpreters
of the period, endorses the view of some at the time who feared that "the
power conferred on Congress by this [thirteenth] constitutional amendment is
an indefinite power, unlimited except by the passions or caprice of those who
may assume to exercise it."242
There was other evidence as well. When the Thirteenth Amendment was
ratified, Congress followed immediately with the Civil Rights Act of 1866
which, on its face, assumed a large role for Congress. Pressed directly on the
point, Representative Bingham was ambivalent about whether the proposed
Fourteenth amendment would cloak Congress with the police power or more
indirectly a power only to assure that the states treated their citizens
equally.243
Congress's later enactments of the criminal provisions of the Ku Klux
Klan Act and the Enforcement Act of 1870 tread a very fine line. Professor
Kaczorowski relates that U.S. Attorneys in the South found it difficult to
frame indictments under these statutes in ways that avoided supplanting state
criminal statutes.2" Lower federal judges openly acknowledged that the
Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to adopt laws criminalizing
conduct normally dealt with in the state courts under state laws.4
Moderate Republicans nonetheless vehemently denied the extreme
implications drawn by their Democratic opponents, and their conduct bears out
their sincerity. While acknowledging the revolutionary nature of these
laws,246 moderate Republicans swore their loyalty to the basic principles of
federalism and the autonomy of the states. The Civil Rights Act, in condi-
tioning federal intervention on an acts having been "under color of" state law,
honored the traditional understanding that the primary responsibility for the
protection of citizens laid with the states. Nevada Senator William Stewart
explained, "[w]hen I reflect how easy it is for the states to avoid the
operations of this bill ..., I think that it is robbed of its coercive fea-
tures."247 The same understanding is even clearer in the language of the
241. See supra text accompanying notes 166-79.
242. Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 905 (quoting Congressman Charles A.
Eldridge of Wisconsin, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1156 (1866)).
243. Id. at 1088-94, discussed in Farber and Muench, supra note 117, at 270-71.
244. Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 920-22.
245. Id. at 920.
246. Maine Senator Lot M. Morrill, for instance, admitted of the Civil Rights Act
"that this species of legislation is absolutely revolutionary. But," he added, "are we
not in the midst of a revolution?" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291, quoted
in FONER, supra note 117, at 245. See also Kaczorowski, supra note 117, at 916.
247. Foner, supra note 117, at 245.
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Privileges or Immunities Clause. It enjoins the states in the first instance to
protect the fundamental rights of citizens. To some Republicans, the chief
evils to be remedied were simply discriminatory state laws. They assumed
that the states would protect the fundamental rights of some citizens, at least
the politically powerful class of white planters. If the states would extend the
same protections to all others there would be no necessity for federal
intervention. Federal intervention would be required only to protect
fundamental rights of citizenship demanded by natural law and would thus
also be limited to the protection of just these rights.24 Even when it dealt
specifically with the problem of private violence in the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, Congress retained the condition that acts be under color of state
law.2
49
In addition, Congress, the U.S. Attorneys and the Courts faced a legal
system in the South that recalcitrantjudges and sheriffs had broken down from
within and the Ku Klux Klan had assaulted from without.25 Any civil
rights enforcement in the South had to come from the federal government, but
the government's involvement was conditioned on precisely those circum-
stances.
This ambivalence in Republican thought plainly complicates interpreta-
tion. Republican theory throws out in different contexts three disparate ideas
for reconciliation: national citizenship and with it national, and as assumed by
the Republicans, Congressional power to protect fundamental rights; self-
executing protection of fundamental rights that are not dependant on any act
of Congress; and finally, continued regard for the role of the states in securing
these same rights. There is no clear intention to be gleaned from a patient or
248. See Farber and Muench, supra note 117, at 271 n.138, and FONER, supra
note 117, at 245. Foner points out correctly that this belief was naive: "freedmen
faced rampant violence as well as unequal treatment by sheriffs, judges, and juries,
often under color of laws that did not in fact mention race." Id. The notion of "under
color of' law, however, was flexible enough to embrace actions by these agents, public
and private, even when they acted contrary to state laws, as the Supreme Court was
to hold much later held in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (interpreting
identical language in § 1983). See supra note 229. Congress itself clearly understood
this language to be quite broad when it used it again in the private action provisions
of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). That provision, like the
whole of the Ku Klux Klan Act, was directed at private violence which the southern
states and local governments were impotent to stop. See supra text accompanying
notes 159-165.
249. It is clear from the conditions to which the Act was addressed and the evil
it was to remedy, the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, that the phrase was concerned
with the absence of state efforts to control private violence. See e.g., FONER, supra
note 117 at 454-59.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 159-165.
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careful perusal of language and history. The ambivalence was never grasped
and grappled with.
The task is insurmountable, however, only if we insist that the framers
were perfectly rational, though somewhat obscure, and that every expression
has significance if we can only discern it, as the canons would have it. What
seems more reasonable, where there is obvious and inescapable ambivalence,
is to implement the goals of the Fourteenth Amendment, the "ideals" of the
framers, to the greatest extent possible; essentially to reconstruct the latent
understanding of the framers, that understanding that we can attribute to them
had the discrepancies been considered and resolved. Those goals here are
fairly clear, what is unclear is largely the institutional arrangements to
accomplish them. The goals are national protection of fundamental rights
regardless of Congressional action while preserving to the greatest extent
possible the traditional role of the states as the first line in securing those
rights.
The institutional arrangements that appear best to satisfy these goals
would include, in the first instance, recognition of a duty in the states to
protect the fundamental rights of persons against invasion by anyone and
reliance on Supreme Court review of state decisions regarding private law that
affect fundamental rights.2" Second, an implied cause of action against
private parties who violate fundamental rights, but only when it is relatively
clear that the state responsible for securing the rights will fail itself in its
obligation, even after review of a state private enforcement action. Third, a
251. In an earlier article I addressed a number of possible policy objections to
extending constitutional protection to victims of purely private conduct. The most
weighty of these objections included the inappropriateness of holding private parties
to the same standards as governments and the possibility that the Supreme Court might
become involved in matters best left to the discretion of legislative bodies concerning,
for instance, the allocation of scarce funds.
The answer to the first objection is that there is no imperative to apply the same
standards to both governments and private parties. In determining what legal rights
people should have against other people, as a matter of fundamental law, the Court
ought to consider the very different possible opposing claims that private parties and
the government bring to a dispute. See Madry, supra note 1, at 836-37. See also
Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 536-42.
The answer to the second objection is already well established in our constitutional
jurisprudence. The Court may, and should, follow the wisdom reflected in the political
question doctrine before leaping into areas within the peculiar expertise of legislatures,
agencies, and the executives. Madry, supra note 1, at 840-42. See, e.g., Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of
Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507
(1991) (arguing that the protection required by the Fourteenth Amendment extends
beyond ex post causes of action to include ex ante protection as well).
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power in Congress to establish useful institutions for the enforcement of
federal court judgments, and perhaps causes of action and remedies provided
that they are no less protective of rights than the Supreme Court's own
remedies. 2
Together these arrangements not only satisfy the .ideals of the 39th
Congress, they do so in a way that leaves little conflict. The role of Congress
may be somewhat diminished from the grand claims of the Republican theory
of national citizenship; however, there is nothing in the elaboration of that
theory that makes Congressional guardianship, as opposed to Supreme Court
guardianship, crucial. The regular assumption of Congressional power appears
to have been more a function of the fact that Congress was the principle agent
of change at the time, rather than any implication or corollary of the theory.
Nor do these arrangements alter much the original balance of federalism.253
The states remain the principle source of civil and criminal law, but backed
now by national guarantees of minimal fundamental rights.
It would appear, too, and with no little significance, that this arrangement
of powers is precisely what the Court envisioned in the Civil Rights Cases of
1883Y 4 Earlier, this Article described the important distinction that Justice
Bradley drew there between the mere "violation" of a right and its "abroga-
tion., 255  Bradley elaborated that distinction not just to illuminate the
responsibilities of the states to protect fundamental rights. More immediately,
he was concerned with identifying the threshold for Congressional power
under Section 5. The issue before the Court was the validity of the first and
252. There has been considerable discussion in recent years indicating that
Supreme Court guardianship in fact has been ineffective in spurring large-scale social
change. See, e.g., LARRY D. BARNETT, LEGAL CONSTRUCT, SOCIAL CONCEPT (1993);
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991); CASS R. SUNsTEiN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). The suggestion might be that the task ought therefore
to be left to Congress. However, one partial explanation for the Court's ineffective-
ness may be the Slaughter-House Cases and the Court's abdication of its role under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause to compel state protection of fundamental rights
against all invasion. Of course, Slaughter-House also stands as a dire reminder of the
Court's frequent conservatism and disregard of its duty.
On the other hand, we have to recall that the 39th Congress itself saw the
weakness of relying on a Congress packed with returning Southern Democrats and
turned to the Supreme Court as a guarantor regardless of Congressional action. The
lesson may simply be that there is no institutional arrangement that can guaranty
anything. The conduct of those institutions is still a function of the character of the
people who inhabit them. Concerning the importance of civic virtue, see WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES (1991).
253. See infra part IV.
254. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
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second sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The Court held that those
sections were invalid, not because the Fourteenth Amendment was uncon-
cerned with protecting people from other people, as the Court would now have
it, but because there was no showing that the States had abrogated the rights
sought to be protected by those sections of the Civil Rights Act. Justice
Bradley explained:
But where a subject is not submitted to the general legislative power
of the Congress, but is only submitted thereto for the purpose of
rendering effective some prohibition against particular State
legislation or State action in reference to that subject, the power
given is limited by its object, and any legislation by Congress in the
matter must necessarily be corrective in its character, adapted to
counteract and redress the operation of such prohibited State laws or
proceedings of State officers." 6
The advantages of the Court's original understanding of the roles of
Congress, the Court and the states over the current state action doctrine are
plain. It is in the first instance coherent and quite natural. It rests on
straightforward concepts of rights and appropriate governmental roles, without
reliance on specious notions like "involvement" and its allied alchemy of
private action into state action. Most importantly, of course, it is precisely
what the framers of 1868 intended and went to war to secure. It returns to the
Fourteenth Amendment the revolutionary power it was meant to carry and in
a way that harmonizes the apparently diverse goals of the Amendment's
framers.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE EFFECT ON FEDERALISM
To return this discussion to its beginnings, it is worth considering for a
moment how the conclusion of the last section bears on the principal concern
of the Court in Slaughter-House, the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on
the traditional arrangement of federalism. The short answer, of course, is that
the Court was simply wrong, and probably disingenuous, in its assessment of
the intention of the Amendment's framers. As we have seen, the Republican
framers intended to establish at the national level protection for the
fundamental rights of United States citizens, not just against violation by the
states but against violation by anyone. To accomplish that, they set up
another right at the constitutional level between the states and their citizens
according to which the states must protect citizen against citizen. Therefore
whatever the Court may have feared, its own conduct constituted an even
256. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18.
1994]
59
Madry: Madry: Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
more radical departure from the Constitution than anything reflected in the
Fourteenth Amendment; Congress and the states, after all, at least had the
power to do what they did.
The Court was also wrong, or at least too simplistic, in its appraisal of
Congress's powers under section 5. By imposing upon the states the
obligation to protect the fundamental rights of citizenship, the Fourteenth
Amendment reaffirmed the primary position of the states in securing those
rights. In this scheme, the role of Congress comes only after those of the
states and the Supreme Court and is subordinate to them. It is the Court, in
reviewing the decisions of state courts, and recognizing direct causes of action,
that determines the fundamental rights of citizens when the states fail, as they
did both before and after the Civil War. There is little opportunity for
Congress, as the Slaughter-House Court feared, to "fetter and degrade the
states.257
There is a more interesting answer to the Court's concerns, one that
illuminates the purposes of federalism and how the Fourteenth Amendment
might have transformed it, for better or worse. As a preface to that inquiry,
it is critical to recognize that to the framers of 1787 federalism was not
primarily an end in itself, reflecting the natural rights or limits of either the
state or federal governments. It was rather a carefully conceived strategy for
the promotion of other valued ends. Neither the Federalists, nor the Anti-
Federalists, both of which groups had a hand in the shaping of federalism,
claimed for it an inherent goodness, as royal absolutists, for instance, claimed
for monarchy in the seventeenth century. 8
By the time of the Revolution, the colonists had come to understand their
colonial constitutions largely along the lines of corporate charters. They
regarded the governments they created as agents of the sovereign people
whose structure and limited authority were intended for the achievement of
relatively well understood ends. 9 The arguments of the Federalist Papers
are distinctively instrumental. Madison, in Federalist No. 45, explicitly
rejected as a basis for federalism any supposed natural rights in the states. He
challenged the Anti-Federalists to offer reasons for a more limited national
government that related to the goals of the Revolution:
[I]f.. . the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of
America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection.., that such
a government may derogate from the importance of the governments
of the individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution
effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious
257. See supra text accompanying note 92.
258. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 133, at 1431.
259. See generally id.
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blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions
lavished, not that thepeople of America should enjoy peace, liberty,
and safety, but that the government of the individual States, that
particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of
power and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of
sovereignty?2"
By the time of the publication of the Federalist Papers between 1787 and
1789, Madison's challenge was to some extent rhetorical. The Anti-Federalists
had made their arguments and, as Michael McConnell has noted, even partially
converted Madison to their cause.261 The proposed Constitution reflected an
appreciation for the virtues of decentralization, where decentralization served
the larger ends of government but also the virtues of centralization where
centralization better served those ends.
This original, instrumental understanding of federalism constitutes a
partial response to those who against the Fourteenth Amendment insisted on
the rights of the states. 62 The states had no rights that merely inhered in
their statehood, or even necessarily in the people as sovereigns within their
states. What powers they were delegated were delegated to serve certain ends.
The more complete answer then to the opponents of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is to consider the purposes that the framers imagined for both centraliza-
tion and decentralization and how those purposes might have been affected by
the Amendment.2 63
The virtues of centralization, as the authors of the Federalist Papers saw
them, were six: a united voice in dealings with foreign nations, both in the
260. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at325 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961).
261. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54
U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1491-92 (1987) (book review).
262. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 176-179. Indeed, even John Locke, the
preeminent philosopher of natural law, regarded the state along instrumental lines, as
a means to secure the natural rights of person. See supra text accompanying notes
107-08.
263. For a more thorough discussion of the issues of federalism, see STANLEY
ELKINS AND ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (1993); W. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 599-614 (3d ed. 1986); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism
Matter?, 89 J. POL. EC. 152 (1981); Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale,
6 PUB. CHOICE 19 (Spring, 1969); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER,
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN (1987). The discussion in the text owes much
to Professor McConnell's analysis.
1994]
61
Madry: Madry: Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
nation's defense and to promote trade;26" the conservation of peace among
the states, principally by removing barriers to free trade, preventing discrimi-
nation against citizens of foreign states, and providing a forum for the
settlement of interstate conflicts;25 the promotion of economic prosperity
through the creation of national markets; 2" the realization of the economies
of scale, particularly in matters of common defense;267 and the protection of
individual rights and the common good. In Federalist No. 14, Madison
summarized these goals as follows:
We have seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against
foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the
guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only
substitute for those military establishments which have subverted the
liberties of the Old World and as the proper antidote for the diseases
of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments,
and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by our
own.
2 6 8
The first five are related to fundamental rights only indirectly and do not
require much discussion in the present context. The sixth, however, bears
directly on the federal protection of fundamental interests and an examination
of the institutional arrangements for its realization are revealing.
Madison conceived the threat to fundamental rights almost exclusively in
terms of factions and the federal role in the protection of fundamental rights
as preventing factions from acquiring political power. Though he never
precisely defines what he means by a "faction," it is clear that Madison had
in mind any group, whether a minority or a majority of any electorate, that
might attempt to promote views which endanger fundamental interests and a
particular notion of the common good related to those rights. In Federalist
No. 10 he explains:
If a faction consists of a less than a majority, relief is supplied by
the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its
sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may
convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its
violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is
included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other
264. THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay); No. 10 (James Madison).
265. Id. Nos. 5, 6, 7, 11, 15 (Alexander Hamilton); No. 39 (James Madison).
266. Id. Nos. 11, 12 (Alexander Hamilton).
267. Id. No. 4 (John Jay); Nos. 12, 13 (Alexander Hamilton).
268. Id. No. 14, at 150 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
[Vol. 59
62
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss3/1
PRIVATE ACCOUNTABILITY
hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the
public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public
good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at
the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular govern-
ment, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let
me add that it is the great desideratum by which alone this form of
government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has
so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of
mankind." 9
Madison's objections to relying on the judiciary to protect fundamental rights
are notorious.27 He preferred instead to arrange the institution of govern-
ment in such a way as to prevent any faction, even a majority faction, from
obtaining power. His plan, as he described it in Federalist No. 10 and as it
is implemented in the Constitution, was to maintain a fairly high number of
electors to each representative. This would help to assure that only the most
prominent and, presumably, the wisest legislators would be sent to shape the
nation's policies. As Madison explained:
The effect of [this arrangement] is ... to refine and enlarge the
public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under
such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pro-
nounced by the representatives of the people, will be more
269. Id. No. 10, at 132-33 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
See also NEDELSKY, supra note 104 (arguing that the overriding goal of the
Constitution was to protect in particular rights of property and a notion of the common
good associated with stable rights of property).
270. In his Remarks on Mr. Jefferson 'sDraught of a Constitution, October, 1788,
Madison remarked:
In the State Constitutions and indeed in the Federal one also, no provision
is made for the case of a disagreement in expounding them; and as the
Courts are generally the last in making the decision, it results to them by
refusing or not refusing to execute a law, to stamp it with its final
character. This makes the Judiciary Department paramount in fact to the
Legislature, which was never intended and can never be proper.
James Madison, Remarks on Mr. Jefferson's Draught of a Constitution, October 1788,
in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES
MADISON 65-66 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973).
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consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people
themselves, convened for the purpose."'
The measure is more likely to succeed in a large republic than a small because
in the larger republic "it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to
practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried
,i272
To successfully protect rights in a nation where local governments are
preserved, however, the electoral arrangements for the national government
must also be accompanied by, on the one hand, a delegation to the national
government of powers whose improvident exercise is likely to infringe rights,
and on the other hand, a corresponding disability in the states.273 This is the
arrangement that we see, for example, with regard to relations between debtors
and creditors. Article I, Section 8 empowers Congress to establish "uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States" while
Section 10 prohibits any state from passing any "Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts."274 Article I contains similar powers and disabilities related
to interstate commerce.
Particularly in light of Madison's declaration that the protection of rights
was "the great desideratum, by which this government can be rescued from
opprobrium," it is remarkable that the protection of rights in this manner, or
any other, was limited principally to the protection of creditors and the
institutions of interstate trade. As this article discussed earlier, the Constitu-
tion contained few other safeguards against the violation of fundamental
interests by anyone other than the new government itself.2  Indeed, the
Constitution of 1791 did not even assure the existence of private property and
the right to contract.
27 6
Madison suggests later in Federalist No. 10 that the various powers of
government were divided between the national and the state governments
according to the interests that they touched upon, whether the interests were
271. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 134 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961).
272. Id. This idea sits uneasily with one of the more important justifications for
retaining small political units, which is that in a small unit, the citizens are better able
to vigilantly observe and restrain the excesses of self-interested politicians. See Storing,
supra note 113, at 17-18.
273. One alternative, which Madison championed unsuccessfily, was to permit
the federal legislature to review every proposed state law and exercise a veto in cases
of laws that violated fundamental rights. See NEDELSKY, supra note 104, at 61-62.
274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
276. See also McConnell, supra note 116.
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of a peculiarly local or national character. He said, "The federal Constitution
forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests
being referred to the national, the local and particular, to the State legisla-
tures."2" How horribly ironic then, that the rights which tore this country
apart in 1860 and which made reconstruction so difficult almost a decade later
were the very rights deemed to be of only local concern and left to the
protection of the states. Insofar as it was the intent of the framers to secure
rights that were necessary to form an indissoluble union, the Civil War
k'evealed the risks inherent in failing to secure at the national level universal,
personal and political, as opposed to merely commercial, interests.
Surely part of the reason for not restricting the states more thoroughly in
the Constitution was the fact that the states, as colonies, had long been the
trustees of the common law within their jurisdictions. Even if they might not
be trusted to uphold the rights of creditors against debtors in all cases, and if
they might discriminate against commerce from other states, there was little
reason to believe that the states were on the brink of destroying the right to
private property or the ability of at least adult free men to enter into binding
contracts.27
There was also the attachment that people had developed for their states
which the framers as a practical matter were bound to accommodate. Had the
framers attempted to strip from the state such basic powers as the admin-
istration of the civil and criminal laws, it is unlikely that the new Constitution
would ever have been ratified. The authors of the Federalist Papers repeatedly
277. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 135 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961). The same idea is repeated and elaborated on in Federalist No. 14 where
Madison reassures his readers that
"[i]n the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is
not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws.
Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all
the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the
separate provisions of any."
THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 152 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
It is not clear how debtor relief laws fit within this definition of an object which
could not "be attained by the separate provisions of any." Certainly each state could
easily create effective debtor relief laws that did not require the coordinated efforts of
any other state. If the concern was to prevent discriminatory debtor relief laws, that
end was already achieved through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.
The example of debtor relief laws suggests that the dividing line between national
and local issues may have been drawn where the states could currently be trusted to
honor and protect interests thought to be impbrtant. See infra text accompanying note
280.
278. McConnell, supra note 116, at 293.
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sought to assure their readers that the status of the states was not in jeopardy.
On this account Garry Wills observed:
There was a certain ambiguity forced on Publius as a propagandist.
He has to argue for a stronger government and at the same time
quiet the fears of strong government. When calling the Articles
inadequate, Publius was a champion of centralization. When
assuring the nervous states that centralization would not mean the
obliteration of lesser units, Publius can be quoted as a champion of
the dispersion of power out to subordinate parts of the govern-
ment.2"
What was true of Hamilton, Madison and Jay as Publius was certainly true of
them as delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
But there was also at least one theoretical and instrumental reason for
leaving with the states specifically jurisdiction over the civil and criminal
laws, the laws which most immediately secure fundamental interests against
invasion by anyone.280 It was a reason not urged by the Anti-Federalists,
279. Garry Wills, Introduction, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Garry Wills, ed.,
1982). See e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 167-68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin
F. Wright ed., 1961) ("The administration of private justice between the citizens of the
same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all
those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can
never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction.").
280. In addition to whatever value there might be in leaving to the states the
administration specifically of the civil and criminal laws, the laws which I consider to
be the principal guarantees of fundamental interests against other persons and therefore
of universal interest, there were also independently good reasons to leave to the states
jurisdiction over matters which truly were of local concern: the provision and
financing of public goods, like local roads, libraries, schools and parks; land use
control to avoid nuisances; etc. In the first place, these are matters which could not
easily be dealt with by a national congress, most of whose members were unfamiliar
and unconcerned with much outside of their jurisdictions. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
No. 46 (James Madison); 1 STORING, supra note 113, at 15; McConnell, supra note
116, at 1493-94.
Many of the Anti-Federalists also urged that keeping these matters for local
decision permitted citizens to be involved in public deliberations in a way that would
not be possible if the principal site of debate were the nation's capital, far removed
from most people. Indeed, to the Anti-Federalists, this possibility was the chief and
essential mechanism for preserving the public virtue that was the foundation for
republican freedom. Herbert Storing summarized the sentiments of the Anti-Federalists
as follows: "More often the Anti-Federalists thought of the whole organization of the
polity as having an educative function. The small republic was seen as a school of
citizenship as much as a scheme for government." I STORING, supra note 113, at 21.
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but recognized by Madison, Hamilton and the Federalists framers. While
Madison saw the powers of the new federal government tempered by the
institutional arrangements of limited powers, representation, separation of
powers and checks and balances; and the Anti-Federalists sought to constrain
excesses by the Bill of Rights, Hamilton and Madison also believed that strong
states could act as a counterpoise to a too-strong federal government. They
believed too that the strength of each state government was a function of the
devotion held for it by its citizens. That devotion in turn was the natural
response of a citizenry to the role of the government in securing fundamental
interests through the civil and criminal laws. Hamilton explained:
But let it be admitted, for argument sake, that mere wantonness
and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget [a disposition in
the federal government to divest the states of their authority], still
it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of
the national representatives, or in other words of the people of the
several States would control the indulgence of so extravagant an
appetite ....
The superiority of influence in favor of the particular govern-
ments would result partly from the diffusive construction of the
national government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to
which the attention of the State administrations would be directed.
There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province
of the State governments which alone suffices to place the matter in
Michael McConnell has argued that leaving these matters to the local govern-
ments also would permit innovations spurred by the competition to attract business to
locate within their bounds. See McConnell, supra note 116, at 1498-1500. McConnell
suggests further that the framers might have left to the states the discretion to regulate
matters of morals out of a fear that if such power were left to the new federal
government, a single universal law would make it more difficult, indeed impossible,
to escape to a more congenial jurisdiction where one might freely exercise one's
conscience. Given the diversity of opinion within the nation, were the power left to
the states, different states would likely regulate these matters differently and a dissident
would have a greater possibility of finding freedom in a community more congenial
to his or her inclinations. See id. at 1506. The difficulty with such a view is that it
assumes that the only way in which a matter might be dealt with in a constitution is
through the allocation of some power. That is not the case, as the Bill of Rights
illustrates. Matters of conscience might have been better protected universally by
extending the disabilities of the Bill of Rights to cover the states as well as the federal
government. This is the strategy that the framers adopted in Article I, §§ 9, 10. Each
prohibits its respective subject from passing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1.
1994]
67
Madry: Madry: Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
a clear and satisfactory light,-I mean the ordinary administration
of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most power-
ful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience
and attachment. It is that which being the immediate and visible
guardian of life and property having its benefits and its terrors in
constant activity before the public eye... contributes, more than
any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people,
affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government. This great
cement of society ... independent of all other causes of influence,
would ensure them so decided an empire over their respective
citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and,
not unfrequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.28'
Had the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment given to Congress the
power "to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States," as Congressman Bingham had originally
proposed, the Fourteenth Amendment may well have undermined this
dimension of federalism by drastically altering the balance of power between
the states and the national government. But we have seen that the framers of
1868 declared their allegiance to the traditional presumption that the primary
responsibility for enforcing the civil and criminal law would remain with the
states.282 Replacing the Congressional grant with a self-executing right
institutionalized that presumption and insulated the states against a Congress
determined to enact its own national civil and criminal laws.
Nonetheless, by placing the Supreme Court and Congress as potentially
coercive forces aimed at the backs of the states, one might argue that their
integrity as guardians of fundamental interests had been compromised. Two
factors blunt this objection. First, there is no evidence that the discretion of
the states over fundamental interests, through their power over the civil and
281. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 168-69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F.
Wright ed., 1961). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 357 (James Madison)
(Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961) ("In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.
Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments
will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."). The
Federalist Papers are vague on the mechanics by which the states might resist a
usurpatious federal government. Akhil Reed Amar has identified three possibilities:
(1) politically in the ability of the state governments to monitor and inform their
constituents of federal actions, (2) militarily through the maintenance of state militias,
and (3) legally by creating causes of action against federal officials who violate
fundamental interests. See Amar, supra note 133, at 1492-1519.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 246-264.
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criminal law, was ever conceived as a freedom to define these interests as they
saw fit. Many, indeed, understood the citizens of the United States to be a
united people precisely in their common commitment to common rights and
liberties. John Jay appealed to this ideal in urging the adoption of the new
Constitution:
This country and this people seem to have been made for each
other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an
inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united
to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a
number of unsocial, jealous and alien sovereignties.
Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and
denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have
uniformly been one people; each individual citizen every where
enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection.283
As we have seen, where the states had demonstrated the greatest inclination
towards abuse, the framers did not hesitate to protect fundamental interests in
the Constitution through the same sorts of rights aimed at the new federal
government.
This ideal prevailed still following the Civil War. Defending his original
draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressman Bingham denied that the
Amendment would deprive any state of its rights on the ground that no state
had ever reserved to itself the power to deny the rights protected by the
Amendment. He argued that these rights were "universal and independent of
all local State legislation" and "belonged, by the gift of God," to all.28a
Second, the existence of a higher standard, backed by the threat of
coercive enforcement, does not in itself deprive a state of dignity and the right
to respect and loyalty any more than the civil and criminal laws deprive a
virtuous citizen of dignity and the right to respect. The allegiance on which
Hamilton relied to fortify the states was not a reaction to unbridled power; it
was rather the response accorded to a state actually "being the immediate and
visible guardian of life and property.
2 1
We might hold a neighbor in low regard if we felt that that neighbor
refrained from a hundred injustices only out of fear of the law. If the same
were true of a state, that it refrained from abusing its citizens only because of
the Fourteenth Amendment, that state would already have forfeited the respect
of its citizens and proven the virtue of the Amendment. Another, and even
283. THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 94 (John Jay) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961).
284. Farber and Muench, supra note 117, at 270.
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more likely possibility is that a majority of the citizens of the state might
demand the injustice, since it would be levied against the minority of citizens.
In that case, the citizens might resent the acquiescence of the state and even
form themselves into vigilante groups opposed to the states, as some citizens
in the South formed themselves into the Ku Klux Klan during reconstruction.
That very possibility, however, and the example of the factitious Klan, is only
further evidence for the wisdom of federal protection of fundamental interests.
We value strong stateg, after all, to oppose a usurpatious federal government,
not to permit it disregard the values and liberties that unite us into a nation
and whose protection, as Madison observed, is "the great desideratum" by
which the virtue of the government would be judged.
It may be too strong to claim that the Fourteenth Amendment perfected
federalism, as if any human institution administered by beings as imperfect as
we could ever be perfected.286 But it is fair to say that the Fourteenth
Amendment, as conceived by its framers, rather than destroying federalism,
as the majority in Slaughter-House feared, improved upon the original
arrangements of federalism. By checking the excesses of the states, it better
secured rights regarded as universal and fundamental by the founding fathers
but left precariously, as the Civil War demonstrated, wholly to the guardian-
ship of the states.
286. See supra note 253.
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